

**Premise: Our "mental/behavioral" sciences will remain *primitive*, or somewhat like *pre-Newton Physics*, at least until the ancient philosophical question of "good" becomes resolved... to then serve as a founding principal from which to explore this kind of reality.**

# Physical Ethics

By The Philosopher Eric  
April 19, 2014

Select to Email the author at: [thephilosophereric@gmail.com](mailto:thephilosophereric@gmail.com)

## **Selectable Table of Contents:**

**"A Cocktail Party" Version**

**First Author's Note**

**Second Author's Note**

**Chapter 1: Introduction**

**Chapter 2: Primary Operation, or "Instinct"**

**Chapter 3: Secondary Operation, or "Self"**

**Chapter 4: ((Why Has "Self" Evolved?))**

**Chapter 5: ((The Nature of Definition))**

**Chapter 6: The Personal Entity**

**Chapter 7: The Mind**

**Chapter 8: The Non-Conscious Mind**

**Chapter 9: The Conscious Mind**

**Chapter 10: Empathy and Theory of Mind Sensations**

**Chapter 11: The Social Entity and Subject Identification**

**Chapter 12: A Concise Recap**

**A Final Author's Note**

## "A Cocktail Party" Version

Consider existence from the perspective of *a human, a dog, a plant, a computer, and finally a rock*. For *the computer* and *the rock*, perhaps existence is perfectly "insignificant," or perhaps events alter subjects such as these without having any personal relevance to them. Furthermore we generally treat *plants* as if they're just as oblivious in a personal sense — regardless of what is done to this kind of life, perhaps existence occurs just as "irrelevantly" for these subjects, as it seems to for *computers* and for *rocks*. When *the human* and *the dog* are considered, however, it's generally thought that events affect subjects such as these in a way that can be "personally relevant." Unlike the other subjects, apparently existence can have positive and negative implications to both *the human* and *the dog*. This dynamic will thus be referred to here as "the good and bad" aspect of reality.

Though philosophers must have pondered this element of our nature from the time that humanity was quite young, there is still no generally accepted understanding of what good and bad essentially *are* — or that which gives existence an apparent positive/negative potential for *the human, the dog, the bird*, and so on, though not for subjects such as *the plant* and *the computer*. But given that this feature should also be quite fundamental, perhaps the scientific community will need to reach a consensus here in order to resolve various standard questions associated with our nature. I believe that the following model of positive and negative personal existence will ultimately become adopted:

In one regard there are just two "operating systems" by which a given subject may function. The more primary is motivated by factors other than "sensations," and thus here dynamics like *pain, beauty, frustration, humor, hatred, love, fear*, and so on, are simply not "in play." Presumably *microbes, fungi, and plants* experience no sensations, and thus they function purely by means of this first mechanism — which I refer as "instinct."

Under the complementary system, however, positive and negative sensations serve as *punishment* and *reward* from which to motivate the function of this second dynamic. Thus sensations like *hunger, itchiness, hope, fun, anger, orgasm, heat, cold*, and so on, constitute the essential nature of both "good" and "bad" — or effectively serve as an ideology from which to derive how these subjects may lead their lives and structure their societies "properly." I refer to this sensations mechanism as "self."

The difference between the subjects mentioned above from this perspective, is that *the human* and *the dog* seem to experience "sensations," while *the plant, the computer, and the rock*, presumably do not. Regardless however, once there is an accepted understanding of a personal relevance, or good/bad dynamic, then our "mental/behavioral" sciences (like *Psychology, Sociology, Cognition*, and so on) will finally gain founding associated theory from which to work. Furthermore this achievement would bring science "an ideology," or a position from which to answer all questions associated with living our lives and structuring our societies, in a manner which is theoretically "good" for a given subject.

This theory is used here, for example, to build a physical concept of "mind," "non-conscious mind," as well as an involved model of "human consciousness." With my theory I seek to help the ancient discipline of philosophy, enter the relatively dynamic and new discipline of science — or an ascension which should cause science's "mental/behavioral" fields, to finally emerge from their current "primitive" state of being.

[Select to open "A Cocktail Party Version" blog page.](#)

[Select to Return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## First Author's Note

I've noticed two general positions from which my ideas are challenged, though they also *contradict* – if one of these objections is valid, then the other should not be. The more serious of the two, I think, is the assertion that the entire concept of "good and bad" is *inherently unscientific*, or perhaps *arbitrary/anecdotal*. This theme seems to prevail in academic circles. The contrary general objection, however, asserts instead that the presented premise is actually quite well known. Here I may essentially be told "Your *feel good* theory simply cannot be important, since the relevance of sensations has long been understood." The following paragraph should be sufficient to dismiss this second concern, leaving the remaining ideas here to address the more serious "academic objection."

I theorize that *good and bad* are essentially "[Utilitarian](#)," or "[Hedonistic](#)," or going back to ancient Greece my theory may be termed "[Epicurean](#)." Thus assertions that I'm proposing an answer which has already been accepted, can be quickly dispelled by reviewing any of these terms — associated dialogue demonstrate that "sensations" have by no means gained acceptance as the basic element which creates "positive and negative personal existence." (As a convenience, the blue/underlined terms here may be selected to bring up their current "Wikipedia" interpretations.)

Moving now to "the academic objection," this is essentially the assertion that the entire concept of good and bad is "naturally unscientific," or perhaps "arbitrary/anecdotal." But if the institution of science were to nevertheless seek an ideology from which to describe the nature of positive and negative personal existence, then a "sensations theory" should be a strong candidate. Observe that the modern field of [Economics](#) is actually founded upon this specific principal – here "a util" is defined as "a unit of happiness," and "[utility](#)" is accepted to increase at a diminishing marginal rate as goods and services are consumed.

Economists also use an effective disclaimer, however, which prevents this premise from serving as "a functional ideology." This disclaimer essentially states: *We seek to describe how people "behave only." Utilitarianism is useful in this respect, specifically because people do apparently attempt to promote their own happiness in this manner. But we cannot further assume that "happiness" is inherently "good" for a subject to experience.* [Utilitarianism](#) would subject economists to an assortment of "sensitive" personal and social questions... *if this effective disclaimer did not exist.* As it is, however, questions regarding how we "should behave," can technically be deferred for far less controversial speculation that merely considers how we "do behave."

Selectable links to "Wikipedia" are commonly provided here in order to help support various presented assertions. But unfortunately I've found nothing on this site that's nearly as concise as the above disclaimer – and this was merely paraphrased from a general economics text that I recall from my college years. So rather than reference an encyclopedia to demonstrate this "supposed" economics disclaimer, permit me to use the following scenario: A modern economist is obviously free to use utility theory in order to predict the likelihood that a specific women will seek to abort her pregnancy. But is this economist also free to use our shared premise in order to theorize whether or not an abortion would be "good" for her?... or for her society?... or for her fetus?... *Of course not!* Today such questions are thought to be fundamentally arbitrary/anecdotal, or at least

be "out of bounds" such that they may only be pondered under non-science disciplines with headings such as [Philosophy](#), [Ethics](#), and [Religion](#).

*My own position*, conversely, is that if existence can indeed be positive or negative to the human and various other types of subject, then this should concern a basic aspect of reality that scientists will thus be required to theorize. I suspect that this void is largely why modern science has not yet developed an effective model of "[consciousness](#)" for example. Regardless, the premise here is that "mental/behavioral" sciences *are quite primitive today*, and will remain so without accepted theory addressing our "good/bad" potential – or a trait which *we seem to have*, but rocks, computers, and plants, *apparently do not*.

[Select to open "\*\*First Author's Note\*\*" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Second Author's Note

Radical ideas tend to be resisted quite naturally, and mine are no exception. My worries, however, mainly involve the normal challenges associated with communication. Consider for example the job of assembling a standard kit which contains many parts that come packaged in a compact box. Though this assembly might not actually be very difficult, interpreting a set of written instructions which gives detailed directions describing what needs to be done, can still be quite challenging. Similarly my own ideas can also have such complexity, even though they generally do seem quite intuitive in the end.

One way that I've chosen to help address this issue is to occasionally use auxiliary discussions for potential consideration. With blue descriptions placed inside **((double parentheses))**, a reader may then decide whether or not to consider the associated **dark red discussion**. By clearly identifying material which may simply be glanced over or perhaps ignored entirely, a valid assessment of my ideas might be attained without investing quite as much. But if a general appreciation does develop, then this material should begin to serve less in the capacity of "complication," and more the capacity of "clarification." I do hope to not overly burden anyone during these discussions.

Nevertheless it may still be difficult to keep a larger perspective in mind, and even while considering points which are quite essential. Thus I suggest review of "Chapter 12: A Concise Recap" as needed, and perhaps after this note. A broad overview should generally help various specific arguments become understood.

Also, apparently some have found it helpful to initially begin with "the mind chapters," which are numbered 7, 8, and 9. Though we each have an intimate understanding of our own **conscious** realms of existence, unfortunately this concept seems to baffle science even still. But if these chapters do seem to present useful descriptions of what we are, then the proceeding work should also become more relevant.

[Select to go to "Chapter 12: A Concise Recap."](#)

[Select to go to "The Mind Chapters," or 7, 8, and 9.](#)

[Select to open "Second Author's Note" Blog Page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 1: Introduction

There is reason to believe that "our great philosophical questions" will always remain *speculative* — countless people have worked on them throughout history, though each has failed to impart established understandings regarding any such uncertainty. Though it may now be tempting to simply abandon philosophical questions altogether, there is also reason to remain hopeful. Observe that in recent centuries, *science* has become a very successful institution for illuminating the nature of reality. Perhaps we'll find that as this relatively new classification of study continues to enlighten us, many of our great philosophical uncertainties will be resolved under this format as well.

This potential might be considered with *suspicion* however, given that philosophical elements of reality are often believed to naturally be uncertain/anecdotal, or even incompatible with scientific elements of reality. Assuming however that reality is a great puzzle with a perpetual interconnection between each of its elements, then various "philosophic dynamics" should need to be understood in order for associated "scientific dynamics" to also be understood. And just as certain physicists before the founding work of [Sir Isaac Newton](#) may have thought that their contributions were more important than they later proved to be, our various "mental/behavioral" sciences should be quite hindered today, given that "philosophical aspects of reality" remain highly speculative.

If such progress were to be made, however, then what would we actually learn? My own work suggests that we'd gain effective definitions for "[the self](#)" and "[consciousness](#)," or ideas which currently challenge science, as well as the essential nature of "good and bad," which is a question that philosophers must have pondered from the dawn of our existence. Perhaps science and philosophy have each failed in these areas, somewhat given the assumption that they aren't formally connected. But if there is ultimately just *one reality*, then we might have predicted that problems would occur where science and philosophy must inevitably meet.

The theory here postulates two basic dynamics of reality. The first of them is referred to as "instinct," and this term is used to represent *primary function*. The second is referred to as "self," or something which is theorized to concern both *consciousness* and the essential nature of *good and bad* for any given subject.

The goal of this discussion is not simply to present answers which are "useful," but more importantly to present our various philosophical uncertainties as aspects of reality that the institution of science must not be permitted to ignore. If it is to build effective models describing basic human dynamics, then in these efforts science should be expected to also determine the nature of "personal significance" for subjects like the human which seem to harbor this potential.

((The two auxiliary paragraphs here consider the thought that scientists might be attempting to understand the nature of "personal relevance," or "good and bad," *at this very moment*.)

If modern researchers were actively exploring this aspect of reality in the role of "scientist" rather than just traditional "philosopher," then general philosophers like myself should be quite interested to hear of any associated progress. Which

theories are modern scientists proposing to describe the concept of "positive and negative personal existence"? What evidence is being presented to support this work? Has any theory achieved a reasonable degree of acceptance so far?

If scientists were actively attempting to describe how existence functions in this regard today, this would be very positive news from my own perspective! But to the extent that any such theory were to *gain acceptance*, this work should hardly go unnoticed. Given the dearth of such news however, apparently modern science has not yet come far in this respect – or perhaps as I maintain, scientists in general do not yet view "personal relevance," or "good and bad," to be an aspect of existence which is subject to scientific query.

End.))

By this point it should be quite clear that I seek nothing less than "a great new revolution." Therefore my position may be considered from two opposing extremities – or essentially one of *disagreement*, and conversely one of *agreement*.

To first consider an opposing position, this might be that there is no potential for this supposed "revolution" to actually occur. Here it might be stated that "mental/behavioral" sciences are already quite healthy, or at least that philosophical elements of reality must inherently be considered outside the realm of science. And though we may acknowledge that great uncertainties do remain in fields like *Psychology* and *Sociology*, perhaps these uncertainties are no different from the ones that reside in presumably well founded fields, like *Physics* and *Chemistry*.

One minor implication of such a position, however, is that my own ideas should therefore be quite useless. But rather than spend further time pondering my work from this perspective, perhaps it would be more effective to plainly state those founding understandings which underlie "mental/behavioral" fields... and thus potentially refute my presentation before it begins. If it can be established that modern [Psychiatry](#), [Psychology](#), [Cognition](#), [Sociology](#), and so on do indeed have "basic understandings from which to work," then my own ideas (which are presented to potentially found such fields) may be dismissed. So then *who are* the perhaps great theorists who've founded our perhaps great "mental/behavioral" fields, and *what specifically* do their theories state? I do enjoy considering such arguments, so all intelligent observation in this regard shall be quite welcome!

Moving now to the opposite position, this is agreement that these fields are still quite primitive. For any and all who find themselves in agreement, I also welcome you! Our remaining task is to develop an effective foundation from which to explore "mental/behavioral" aspects of reality, so that more effective work might then occur. From this perspective you may find ways to improve my own models, or perhaps develop much different theory regarding associated dynamics.

Beyond these two positions of "solid conviction," however, unfortunately a substantial group should remain that reside in the middle. Perhaps some suspect that they aren't sufficiently "educated" in these fields to credibly support my premise. Furthermore the opposite may be true for others – here there may be a "professional" understanding of what occurs in these fields that makes it difficult to sacrifice the current system for



radical new approaches. Regardless of their source, however, "weak convictions" should also bring a tendency to ponder my ideas with little potential to be convinced of anything new – and thus make the following exercise somewhat pointless.

So before we get into the specifics of my theory, I do encourage all who reside in the middle... to nevertheless attempt to pick a side. If you believe that you do not have the proper education from which to potentially impute existing "mental/behavioral" fields, I encourage you to educate yourself about what is and what is not understood in them. If your review does suggest that these fields are indeed "post-Newton," or reasonably well founded, then you may confidently dismiss my own ideas by stating what these founding understandings happen to be.

Furthermore if you *do* see evidence of basic structural problems in these fields, but perhaps remain "on the fence" somewhat because you're distinctly aware of the effects that this position would have to your own work in Psychology, Sociology, Cognitive Science, or any other, should you not also view this as a natural bias to be fought? Either way I do hope for as many as possible gather their convictions well enough to first decide whether or not these fields are still in need of "fundamental understandings from which to work."

((I'm not aware of any standard classification which roughly encompasses the fields which are most associated with my own ideas, so I've chosen to call them "mental/behavioral" sciences. The two paragraphs here give a more detailed listing.

[Psychology](#) and [Psychiatry](#) are prime examples, though the nonhuman subjects found in [Zoology](#) require inclusion as well. "Social studies," like [Anthropology](#), [Sociology](#) and [Political Science](#) also apply (...as does [Economics](#), though this field does already "formally conform" with my ideas, as mentioned in "The First Author's Note"). For a discipline that specifically references "the mind," [Cognitive Science](#) seems better represented than [Neuroscience](#), since it has fewer "medical/engineering" attributes. A dearth of engineering details also helps explain why my work has only vague [Computer Science](#) implications.

In a general sense the term "life" represents the subject of my work, though "conscious life" is a primary focus, and "the human" is indeed the main subject of consideration. So to be clear, I believe that today's "mental/behavioral" fields lack basic understandings from which to work, and will therefore remain "primitive," at least until an accepted understanding of positive and negative personal existence is gained — or that we must figure out that which is most essentially good/bad for a given subject.

End.))

[Select to open "Chapter 1" Blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 2: Primary Operation, or "Instinct"

To illustrate "the primary mode of function" from the general model which will now be presented, *the computer* serves an effective analogy. A computer essentially operates by implementing a series of logic statements such as "If (this is true)... then (something is done)." And because we create these machines ourselves, we might also confidently assume that they do not possess something such as our own "consciousness" or "self." If we were to build a machine with this sort of "personal entity," we would presumably be aware of it. (Unfortunately, standard definitions for the terms "[consciousness](#)" and "[self](#)" will need to suffice for the moment.)

One result of a computer's presumably non-existent consciousness/self/personal entity *from my own definitions*, however, is that existence must then be perfectly "insignificant" to it. Regardless of whether it *succeeds or fails in accomplishing its intended duties*, or its *praised or scolded*, or its *circuits melt*, all that occurs during a computer's existence would then have no "relevance" to it. Without a "personal entity" or "self," under my definitions there is no potential for "good" or "bad" to exist for a computer... or for anything else.

*Primary existence*, then, shall be defined to occur under such a complete absence of personal significance. This "instinct mode" will address the entire operation of subjects that do not possess a personal entity, which would presumably include [microbes](#), [plants](#), [fungi](#), and similarly basic "life." Furthermore this dynamic should also be responsible for the vast majority of operations which occur in subjects that do indeed harbor a personal entity. In the human, for example, this "instinct" might address *cell production, hair growth, heart function*, and so on.

It might be helpful to think of this dynamic as "a series of perfectly irrelevant logic statements." For example, perhaps one of the countless such statements that operate a given *tree* may be expressed as, "If the weather becomes warm... then produce more flowers." Regardless of whether this tree happens to be "healthy," "diseased," or "engulfed in flames," the events that affect it will not be "good" or "bad" for it – if it does indeed function exclusively through this "instinct mechanism." *Personal relevance*, or *good and bad*, is defined here to not exist.

To perhaps be even more plain about this definition, however, observe that a subject such as "water," or "a rock," or "a machine," presumably cannot be "rewarded" or "punished." If true, this would mean that nothing can be "good" or "bad" for them – or that they do not contain "selves." I suspect the same to be true for basic forms of "life" in general such as *microbes, plants, and fungi*. Furthermore, even though existence apparently *can be positive or negative to the human*, I also suspect that the vast majority of our own function occurs through this same "instinct mode" that *water, bacteria, and televisions*, seem to use exclusively.

[Select to open "Chapter 2" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 3: Secondary Operation, or "Self"

The first of these two modes of function has been defined such that personal relevance does not exist. Therefore the entire remaining compliment to "instinct" will indeed encompass personal relevance, or something which I call "self." Furthermore I define this mode as something that can only exist through a "consciousness," or "a medium through existence is experienced." With a potential to experience "punishment" or "reward," personal motivation exists to essentially "figure out what to do" – here there is incentive to achieve existence which is *rewarding*, as well as to avoid existence which is *punishing*.

With subjects which may be punished and/or rewarded, thus distinguishing them from the perfectly irrelevant remainder of reality, it will be necessary for us to establish the fundamental nature of a punishment/reward dynamic. How shall this "self," or personally relevant feature which is proposed to exist under some kind of "consciousness medium," specifically be defined?

From the presented model so far, if the human did not harbor "self" then our own existence could not be positive or negative to us — like our computers, humans would have no potential to be *punished* and/or *rewarded*. But because we clearly *do* have a potential for positive and negative personal existence to occur, this does give us opportunities to catalog apparent examples of human punishment and reward. Furthermore when we step back to consider such a list, we might then see various general consistencies between these factors which seem personally relevant to us. Any such consistencies would then serve as "theory of our self," or a potential *essence of human good and bad*. And given the highly related nature that seems to exist between "life on Earth," successful human theory in this respect might also be useful to describe the nature of personal relevance for other conscious subjects as well.

So to begin with factors that are negatively significant to the human, I see *pain* as the greatest potential source of negative experience, or "punishment," that we generally endure. Other negative experiences seem to include *worry, fear, guilt, embarrassment, frustration, anger, betrayal, disrespect, jealousy, shame, disgust, boredom, remorse, sadness, itchiness, hatred, loneliness*, and so on. As I see it, these conscious experiences inherently *punish* the human.

Moving now to positive experiences, I see examples of this in *hope, fun, love, beauty, euphoria, friendship, productivity, pride, self-respect, forgiveness, humor*, and so on. As I see it, these conscious experiences inherently *reward* the human.

I also see positive and negative personal dynamics associated with our standard five [senses](#) – certain things *look, sound, taste, smell, or feel* "bad" to us, while others can be "rewarding." Furthermore, being deprived of *sex, food, water, or air* seem to generally bring negative personal experiences, while this sort of access seems positive.

((This two paragraph disclaimer addresses "biased evidence.")

I do realize that the above list may be viewed as a way for me to promote my own biases concerning the essential nature of "human good and bad." There also seems to be a slightly different (and useful) perspective from which to consider it

however. Though I do present the above list somewhat as "evidence of reality," it is more importantly given as a means from which to help define various terms associated with the following model. Ultimately my work concerns "the construction of theory" rather than "the testing of theory."

Most anyone could compose a list from which to theorize "significance which defines self" in order to build a model such as mine – and I certainly encourage these efforts! Observe that each such definition will, by definition, be a valid definition. The testing of an associated theory, however, will not come until its implications are compared against observations of how reality seems to function in practice. This is also where the potential "usefulness" of any associated definition may be assessed.

End.))

With the above list from which to theorize personal significance for the human... and thus an associated definition of "self," I see one distinct consistency throughout. Each of these factors seem to concern *positive/negative sensations*. Thus this second mode of function, which is defined to exist beyond "instinct," shall be "*the conscious experience of feeling good and/or bad.*" Furthermore, given the close relationship that should exist between "all life on Earth," I do assume that all varieties that experience positive and/or negative sensations, effectively possess this second mode of function.

This is my theory addressing the fundamental nature of positive and negative existence — a simple answer to an ancient and quite contentious question. But hopefully the procedure which is shown here illustrates a concept that *is possible to effectively explore*. Can existence be positive or negative to the human, and perhaps various other types of subject? If so then it should be quite possible for us to build associated lists of apparent positive and negative circumstances. With such a platform from which to work there is a simple procedure from which an associated "personal relevance" idea may be derived, and quite regardless of whether "evolution," "a god," or some other dynamic was responsible for creating what we happen to be. With a list that denotes positive and negative circumstances to a given subject, the element which is ultimately common to each of them should exist as the essential nature of personal significance for it. This element may then be defined as its "personal entity" or "self" – and done so in the scientific exploration of what this subject happens to be.

((This paragraph observes that the presented "sensations" is somewhat different from one common way of defining this term.

Here "sensations" encompass dynamics like *hunger, fear, jealousy, anger, pain, hope, fun, beauty*, and so on — which is all quite standard. But as the following Wikipedia link demonstrates, Psychologists often use a "[sensations](#)" definition which also includes a "sense" element to it. Thus a visual image may commonly be referred to as "sensation" in their work, though this is classified quite separately as "sense" in my own. Though senses of *sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell* may be interpreted such that sensations do also result, from my own

definitions *senses* and *sensations* reside under distinctly separate varieties of input to the conscious mind.

End.))

As previously mentioned, the premise here is essentially "[Epicurean](#)," or "[Hedonistic](#)," or "[Utilitarian](#)." It states that positive and negative sensations define *significance for*, or *relevance for*, or *what matters for*, or *what can be positive or negative for*, or *what can be good or bad for*... conscious varieties of life. Furthermore, for all forms of reality which have no sensations element of consciousness, existence occurs without any personal relevance.

"A plant" is presumably not conscious, and thus lacks *sensations*, and therefore all events would indeed be perfectly irrelevant to it from my definitions. For a given "fly," however, perhaps a consciousness from which to experience sensations does indeed exist. Thus existence would be personally positive or negative to it, based upon the positive to negative sensations which it experiences. So perhaps its *pain*, *frustration*, and *hunger* have a negative personal effect, though presumably positive sensations like *sexual fulfillment*, *the alleviation of hunger*, and perhaps even *fun* can occur as well. From this model, positive to negative existence occurs through a "sensation element of the conscious mind," or something that effectively creates a subject from personally irrelevant matter. Thus sensations have been defined here to exist as "the manifestation of self."

To help practically demonstrate this perspective, consider an event that would generally be perceived as "horrible." Consider being captured and forced to watch, helplessly, while a loved one is beaten. From the presented theory this event will be negative to you (though conceivably positive), given the specific sensations which you experience. Furthermore the same would be true for the person who is actually beaten – associated sensations would define exactly how personally negative (or positive) this event would be. This seems to explain, for example, why surgeons either remove our consciousness before they work on us, or at least reduce our potential to experience the sensation of "pain."

"Personal observations" are all that have been used to demonstrate the validity of this model so far... and this will continue throughout. But might useful adjustments be made to this model? Is a "sensations premise" entirely off? It's the observations of the scientific community in general that will decide extent to which this theory does or does not coincide with reality. My role, however, is a different one. Here various specific elements of existence shall be addressed in respect to this theory, in order to present a model which is more "complete." So our question for the remainder shall be: *With the presented model taken as a given aspect of existence, how might a subject indeed function in a practical sense?*

[Select to open "Chapter 3" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 4: ((Why Has "Self" Evolved?))

((Beyond the potential engineering virtues associated with adding *sensations* to motivate the function of certain varieties of subject, a second auxiliary discussion is also presented here. This second discussion concerns the value of existence which is "tragic."

The stated "sensations mode of function" raises a question of *engineering* – exactly how might this dynamic have been useful in the evolution of associated subjects? Observe for example how quickly our machines have advanced, presumably without any ability to experience sensations. This suggests that evolution could have (and indeed *must have*), constructed very dynamic examples of purely "instinctive life." If so, however, then why has a separate "operating system" also emerged which effectively causes existence to have a "good/bad" potential? What exactly are the engineering virtues of permitting (and forcing) subjects to experience positive (and negative) sensations?

Though it might be helpful here to understand exactly which subjects contain "self," and by elimination which are purely "instinctive," I have only broad presumptions at my disposal. Perhaps subjects that are at least as advanced as *fish* can experience sensations, while the "simplest," such as *microbes*, *plants*, and *fungi*, cannot. I currently have few convictions about "the middle," or essentially where this transition occurs.

For example, in many respects *the ant* does not clearly suggest that it harbors "self," which is to say that it experiences positive and/or negative sensations. Because it seems perfectly willing to sacrifice its body for its society, perhaps it's more similar to "a robot" than something that might experience negative sensations when its body becomes damaged. Nevertheless, if the ant harbors a consciousness from which to experience sensations *in any capacity at all*, then from the presented model it also has an associated "self dynamic." With my very limited grasp of ant biology, however, I currently have few convictions in this respect.

I do, however, presume that the least "complex" subjects, such as *microbes*, *plants*, and *fungi*, harbor *no* personal entity. I base this presumption on the premise that at some point subjects should exist that are so "basic" that they have no consciousness, and thus experience no sensations. From the presented model, "instinct" is the mechanism that underlies the operation of all subjects in our diverse ecosystem – it presumably *pumps blood*, *builds cells*, *battles infection*, and so on. Thus we should expect to find examples that function exclusively through "non-sensation" mechanisms.

So then what might be the engineering virtues of a "punishment/reward," or "personal relevance" dynamic? If all relatively "advanced" subjects experience sensations, then why might instinct alone have been an insufficient means from which to develop them? My theory here is essentially that a punishment/reward dynamic helped simplify evolution's "programming demands," and did so in a way that promotes functionality by addressing "unforeseen challenges."



Notice that under the sensations mode of function, evolution does not mandate what a given subject must do under a given set of circumstances, while it *does* essentially need to decide this for purely instinctive varieties. Rather than specify what must be done given associated circumstances, decisions from the personal mode are effectively "subcontracted out" for a subject itself to evaluate – the subject is encouraged to "consciously decide how to proceed" given the perceived punishments and rewards that exist for it. If punishing/rewarding sensations are set up to generally motivate behavior which promotes genetic proliferation, then this type of subject might succeed under various situations that would be difficult to assess/predict, and presumably would be difficult for exclusively instinctive mechanisms to productively address. From the presented model, sensations are the element which "drives the conscious mind," and apparently consciousness itself can be an effective auxiliary mode of function.

For example, consider the lengthy series of "programming" that a purely instinctive subject should generally possess which specifies how it shall acquire food. Then consider a subject that is very similar in many ways, though this one also has the potential to experience sensations. Observe here that certain instinctive instructions might safely be omitted in the subject that can experience sensations, since this one might "personally" figure out how to get fed to some degree. Thus evolution might denote how "hunger" feels, how various things "taste," and so on, and this subject will then have motivation from which to essentially "figure out what to do" given its perceptions of the various punishments and rewards that exist for it. Under this dynamic perhaps certain "unforeseen challenges" will then have more potential to be overcome, given that evolution isn't required to address them specifically. Instead, here there is "a consciousness" from which to sense personal existence, and in this regard the potential for it to "understand" what is happening. Thus perhaps various situations might then be exploited given that existence can be personally relevant – or the subject's "programming" becomes somewhat "subcontracted out" through personal motivation to figure out how to proceed.

I'm suggesting that if a human were to exist that could not experience sensations, and thus could not be punished or rewarded, then its conscious mind would have no motivation from which to function. This subject would "live," with hair that grows, flowing blood, and so on, but have no incentive to use its otherwise complete conscious mind in order to figure out what to "do." This idea is essentially that evolution developed "sensations" in order to motivate subjects so that they would in this manner "program themselves." And given the advanced nature and proliferation of sensation experiencing subjects, apparently this "consciousness mode of function" does have virtues which surpass the primary mode in certain regards. My associated theory is essentially that "the subcontracting of decisions over to a personal subject, may be helpful to address *unforeseen challenges*."

But why then would *instinctive function* not evolve that works in the same essential manner? Without feeling any "sensations," such as "*thirst*," "*envy*," or "*hope*," observe that a purely instinctive subject theoretically might develop "programming" such that it effectively functions *as if it is* "thirsty," "envious," or

"hopeful." This subject might thus behave exactly as if it has "self," without there actually being any – or without a potential for "punishment" or "reward" to indeed occur.

Perhaps our engineers will ultimately answer this question for us – perhaps they will ultimately build machines that are so "advanced" that this theorized limit to purely instinctive function, does indeed become apparent. If so they might generally conclude: *In some ways we seem to have reached "the limits" of our engineering potential – apparently our "instinctive machines" will remain deficient in areas such as (this, this, this, and so on). In order to improve them in these specific regards, it does not seem possible for us to continue building them in ways which merely "simulate" a punishment/reward dynamic. Instead, apparently we would need to build them such that they truly are punished/rewarded, or machines with consciousness through which to feel good and/or bad based upon the conditions that we specify. In order to engineer them more effectively regarding the above difficulties, apparently we would need to give our machines actual "selves."*

To now linger here for an additional auxiliary discussion, first observe that the dynamics which have caused the ability to feel positive/negative are responsible for all *love, hatred, itchiness, fun, lust, pride, anger, remorse*, and so on. These dynamics were responsible for all "sensations," or theoretically all punishment and reward – or all personal relevance.

The realities of existence mandate that sensations might ultimately prove *positive* to the personal entities that both have existed and will exist, in a cumulative sense, though for the little that we know, *negative sensations* might actually prevail. The theoretical way to assess this would be to add every unit of positive sensation which has been and will be experienced, and deduct every unit of negative sensation which has been and will be experienced. This summation would theoretically quantify the net positive or negative "value" associated with sensations over time, or define what this enormous subject as a whole is ultimately "worth."

Though it's commonly assumed that the emergence of "life" was somehow "a positive development," first observe that from this model existence is completely irrelevant to all perfectly instinctive examples. Theoretically it was only with the emergence of *the personal entity*, or *sensations*, that significance could also exist. And though extensive and impartial research would be required in order to effectively estimate how positive or negative personal existence has been in the past, it's distinctly possible that the emergence of the personal entity both has been, and will presumably continue to be, *an enormous cumulative tragedy*.

Given cumulative future sensations, however, if existence does ultimately represent "a great tragedy for future life," observe the following implication. Here it would be beneficial to this coming subject as a whole, *if it did not actually occur*.



We may never have much ability to accurately estimate the amount of positive and negative sensations that "future life in general" will experience, or even have much ability to "end life on Earth." Furthermore the incentive to actually *attempt such a thing*, would not ultimately exist – "future sensations as a whole" are not specifically the sensations of "anyone." But it is possible that future existence ultimately represents a horrible tragedy for this subject, and quite regardless of whether the presented definition of "good" is used... or any other. If future existence as a whole will indeed be "punishing" to this enormous subject in general... then nonexistence would be beneficial for it regardless.

While we're "out there," however, one might also suggest that a better plan from this scenario than termination, would be for humanity to somehow improve conditions so that positive sensations would ultimately predominate.

Though *positive sensations* are indeed superior to *no sensations* from this model, speculation that humanity might have such a positive effect... is certainly suspicious. Rodents and other mammals apparently do experience sensations, and cumulatively these sensations should be many orders beyond humanity's. And while I can't say whether or not insects generally experience sensations, perhaps they do. Furthermore the birds above and the fish below seem quite conscious – so perhaps their sensations would need human help as well.

If we are given that the balance of sensations for life on Earth generally tends to be *negative*, might humanity then improve this situation for sentient subjects in general to the point that future positive sensations would predominate? And do so given the relatively short future that humanity should be expected to have? And furthermore, even if humanity *did* have the ability to markedly promote positive sensations for existence on Earth over time to the point that these sensations would predominate, the incentive to actually impliment this "enormous general good," would presumably still be missing. The presented model states that incentive exists for us to expend resources in order to promote the welfare of the sensations which *we personally experience*, not the sensations of future existence in general.

End.))

[Select to open "\(\(Why has Self Evolved?\)\)" blog page.](#)

[Select to open "\(\(The Value of Life\)\)" blog page.](#)

[Select to Return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 5: ((The Nature of Definition))

((In this auxiliary chapter it is argued that there can be no "correct" or "incorrect" definition for any given term. Instead we must simply attempt to build definitions in ways that seem "useful."))

With the personal entity broadly presented, definitions must be constructed which illustrate crucial details associated with this function. In order to help prepare for this work, however, the nature of definition itself will now be considered. Apparently I have a somewhat unusual perspective in this respect that may require a bit of attention.

There is a tendency in science to search for "ultimate definitions" for various key terms, implying that these terms represent unique entities that require associated definitions that reflect an ultimately specific nature. Therefore a scientist today might consider reality by means of the term "is" – such as "What *is* [time](#)?" "What *is* [space](#)?" "What *is* [life](#)?" "What *is* [consciousness](#)?" and so on. In my own opinion, this convention can be a very unproductive.

To help demonstrate my concern, consider standard debate regarding the term "life." Observe that some experts argue that [viruses](#) must be classified such that they "live," while others argue the opposite position. The implication here is that if we could determine "the true nature of life" in this regard, then we would gain an additional piece of "the reality puzzle." Thus among other things we could finally understand whether or not viruses actually do "live."

I, conversely, do not view the concept of definition in ultimate or unique terms, but rather as a somewhat arbitrary tool that's simply "built by humans, for human use." From this perspective viruses might productively be termed "living" in one argument, and then just as productively classified in the opposite manner in a separate one. Each definition that is stated for this term will be just as "valid" as any other, though it may or may not be just as "useful." Here terms are nothing more than tools which we design in order to build and convey ideas, and this permits us to construct them any way at all that serves our purposes. Therefore a given definition can never be "correct" (or "incorrect"), though a given definition may indeed be useful (or otherwise) in the context of a given argument.

Apparently there is something referred to in the English language as "reality," as well as a state in this realm which is referred to as "living." Entities such as these, however, *are simply not terms* – they are not tools from which to build and convey ideas. But when in the form of a term, "life" is ultimately just one arbitrary term that resides in one arbitrary language. So in order to effectively develop our arguments, we do require a freedom to design our terms however we deem appropriate.

Consider "a chair" for example. Though it may ultimately "exist," the terms which we use to reference it are simply tools that we build for our own purposes. These terms *may seek to represent the chair*, but they cannot actually *be this specific object* – we cannot actually sit upon such a term, for example. Not only must we be free to design our terms however we like, but by definition, each

definition that we make cannot be "wrong" or "right." Instead it will simply exist as stated.

Nevertheless we should also observe that there are more and less "useful" ways to define a specific term in order to support a specific argument – a given term might do this quite well, or it might render an argument "un-useful" to the point of "nonsense." Furthermore the continuity of a language does depend upon terms that do often retain somewhat common themes behind the many definitions that they might take. This is a well documented aspect of language that our dictionaries plainly demonstrate. Observe that terms in these references are generally given an assortment of definitions, and often with themes that are related.

Perhaps one reason that science has sought "true" rather than just "useful" definitions for various key terms, is to emulate the language of mathematics. Math is odd in the sense that its terms often do practically take on unique definitions. Consider the number "two" for example. Apparently it is most productive in math for this term to exclusively be defined in one specific way. But as nothing more than a human term, it is my position that it could still be assigned a different definition in an argument, and quite regardless of how useful the argument would then be.

Definitions should essentially be viewed as "given," I think, or as points from which an attempt to understand an argument must begin. And even when "nonsense" is the only thing that a specific term helps convey, its definition itself simply cannot be "incorrect" – an argument might not be "useful," though the definitions found within them will, by definition, exist exactly as they are stated.

I address this issue mainly because in the current environment it may be quite simple to dismiss my own ideas through assertions that the presented definitions are, unfortunately, "untrue." I do object to all such assessments on the premise that definitions must instead be viewed as tools from which associated models may be built. If some of my definitions are indeed just "nonsense" in respect their various models, then so be it. But by definition, these definitions themselves must never be considered "false."

My current task in this respect is to convince others to momentarily set aside various competing definitions for mutual terms that we happen to use, so that the specific nature of the presented models might become understood. Once this communication occurs it should then be possible for the implications of these models to be assessed against general observations of reality.

End.))

[Select to open "Chapter 5" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 6: The Personal Entity

In this chapter consideration is given to certain technical parameters associated with "self," or how this idea shall be defined in various specific ways. Might it be useful to define units of self with associated *magnitudes*? How shall self exist *over time*? Might various unique selves be productive to assess together as *one entity*? Such technical issues will need definition in order to more practically demonstrate the presented theory. Note that "instinct" and "self" have been defined as *the exclusive means by which a subject may function*. Here *self* constitutes "the sensation based element," which leaves *instinct* to take the default role of "everything else." The majority of the following discussion concerns the dynamics of "self," leaving the descriptively simple idea of "everything else" to exist as "instinct."

It's quite standard for subjects which have a the ability to experience positive or negative sensations to be referred to as "sentient life." I avoid stating that self exists as *the ability* to feel positive or negative, however, to instead define it as *the experience*, or *the manifestation*, of sensations. From this definition "self" does not exist in a sentient form of life, when sensations are not being experienced at a given moment. If a subject is "perfectly numb," it will lack self for as long as this complete void in sensation is maintained. Under such a state, "instinctive instruments" become the only means through which operation may be incited to occur.

((This paragraph observes that personal terms such as "I" do not represent "self" from my definitions, but rather just "potential self mediums." Here sensations like *jealousy*, *hunger*, *joy*, and so on, take the role of "self" *exclusively*.

For example, in the statement "I hurt myself," the "I" and "myself" simply represent a potential for sensation/self to exist, while the "hurt" represents "self" to the extent that sensations are being referenced. So rather than say "*I am here*" for example, one might say "*This body is here*," or even "*This sentient medium is here*." And though we do generally manage with standard personal terms like "I," and "she," and even "it," they must merely reference "potential self mediums," leaving the dynamics of "self" *exclusively* for *sensations*.

End.))

Beyond the question of whether or not "self" exists, there is also the issue of *degree* to consider. Because there is a spectrum of weaker to stronger sensations which may be experienced, apparently "self" should be defined to have associated positive to negative magnitudes. From this perspective an entity that is in tremendous pain or pleasure will have "more self" during these extremities, than it has when lesser degrees of sensations are being experienced.

((These two paragraphs consider how we might practically measure sensation magnitudes, and thus "magnitudes of self."

Researchers have not yet developed machines from which to effectively quantify the sensations which we experience. For example, I've noticed that when I seek medical help for some kind of *pain*, I'm generally asked "On a scale of 1 to 10, how much pain are you in?" Ideally these professionals would be able to quantify my sensations for themselves. Because our facial muscles seem to automatically display the varieties and magnitudes of sensations which we experience, however, one relatively simple way of quantifying sensations might be developed through computer analysis of human facial expressions. Such data might be very useful, and especially so if earnest expressions can be discerned from the phony.

Perhaps it would ultimately be most effective to monitor sensation magnitudes through more direct biological sources. By measuring various chemical and electrical dynamics associated with sensations, perhaps reasonably accurate ways of estimating sensation/self quantities could be achieved. As things stand however, we're essentially forced to make due with our own inherent abilities in this regard. This involves our natural capacity to experience personal sensations, as well as our abilities to understand what others may be experiencing through assessments of their *circumstances*, their *speech*, their *facial expressions*, and so on.

End.))

Beyond distinctions concerning *the existence and magnitude* of self, there is also the matter of *continuity* to address. Would it be productive to view a subject's self as one continuous entity over time, or rather as a whole spectrum of individual entities? And if the noncontinuous approach does seem useful, what might practically bond these "countless individual selves" so that they do function together effectively enough for species proliferation?

Observe that the present self medium does not directly experience past sensations, as well as those which will be experienced in the future. Because each moment brings unique associated sensations, technically each moment should be useful to consider in terms of a unique associated self – or as an instantaneous entity with an associated positive/negative magnitude.

In practice, however, this "instantaneous present self" does effectively seem to be joined with past and future selves *somewhat*, through "memory of past" and "anticipation of future" sensations. Apparently memory and anticipation can bring *present sensations*, and thus practically connect the present self with remembered past, as well as foreseen future, circumstances.

To begin with "the memory conduit," apparently the nature and intensity of current sensation can vary widely as different memories are processed. For example, remembering the pain of a recent toothache should not bring present sensations which are very similar to the original sensation. Remembering an embarrassing moment, however, might invoke sensations that are quite similar. But regardless of the effect, *without memory* the current self will not have this conscious bond with former selves. Thus a person with no memory of past family experiences, for example, will not have this conscious family connection.

Though we have a conscious tool from which to remember the past, there is apparently no such tool for the future. But even though we can't simply "remember the future," we generally do still seem able to *anticipate* what will happen somewhat given assessments of present circumstances. So to the extent that *anticipation causes present sensations*, the present self does at least become joined with *foreseen potential selves*.

Observe that if a present self medium foresees greater potential for future happiness in some regard, then through the anticipation conduit an associated "hope" may emerge as positive present sensations. Furthermore if there seems to be greater potential for future unhappiness in some regard, then an associated "worry" may emerge as negative present sensations. Thus the sensations of "hope" and "worry" are theorized here as the basic motivation which drives the conscious mind to deal with *foreseen potential circumstances*.

((These seven paragraphs are a practical demonstration of how the anticipation conduit seems to join foreseen potential selves with the present one, by means of "hope" and "worry.")

"Experience" seems to play a role here, which I take from observations of both myself and my son:

I have learned to invest in the future welfare of my current self. Though making these investments may sometimes be difficult, they also tend to *increase my hope* and/or *diminish my worry*, which respectively promotes my positive and diminishes my negative present sensations. I presumably tolerate making investments for the welfare of my future selves, when my associated positive present sensations overcome the negative, given both my *hope* and my *worry* regarding the future.

When he was six it became apparent to me that my son was not taking such an active approach to the welfare of his future selves, presumably given his inexperience. Saving his candy for a future self medium to enjoy often did not seem to bring him much *hope*, for example, so he'd just eat it instead. Similarly, formal education required hard work that often did not seem to gratify his current self medium. For this reason it was my job to force him to make these investments so that he would gain the tools which constitute this kind of education. Furthermore it was also my job to *inspire him* – to help him see the great opportunities that formal education can provide in a way that his current self medium would find this path rewarding through greater levels of *hope*, as well as diminished levels of *worry*, in respect to his future existence.

In practice the selves over time must function harmoniously enough together for species proliferation, though in an ultimate sense each individual moment of sensation/self should be considered independent of the rest... and thus "selfish." Consider the situation of an extremely overweight person who would rather not be this way. Note that an associated present self would not generally be penalized if steps had been taken to lose weight *in the past*, so if possible, this is the option



that we'd expect to be chosen – here the present self would benefit from past sacrifice, though apparently *only at the expense of former selves*. In reality, however, an overweight present self medium faces the prospect of enduring sacrifices associated with losing weight, even though the benefits would instead be reaped by *future selves*. So why then might "a selfish instantaneous self" nevertheless make such an apparent sacrifice for a distinctly different self? The reason that a present self medium might be motivated to lose weight (or any other "investment"), theoretically concerns the current positive sensations associated with *the hope* of taking these steps, and reducing the current negative sensations associated with *the worry* of not taking these steps.

Also consider a situation that would bring substantial short-term positive sensations, though potentially far greater levels of long term negative sensations. "Getting stoned" might be considered in this respect. If this prospect does not bring much *worry*, and refraining does not bring much *hope*, then "getting stoned" is effectively what will (and should) be done from the perspective of the current self. Though the collection of selves may ultimately end up less happy when assessed together given the various problems associated with drug use, it's the happiness of *the current self* that is the operative element. Thus for example, perhaps one thing that helps keep certain "street people" where they are, is generally diminished potential to experience "normal" sensations of hope and/or worry.

If "sensations" are the basic motivation which drives conscious function, however, then why might an apparently knowledgeable and sane "activists," consciously choose the *pain, disfigurement*, and so on, associated with self immolation? Does this demonstrate that the presented model conflicts with observation, given that people obviously do choose to burn themselves in this manner from time to time?

Observe however that if *the worry* associated with these potential negative sensations is not sufficient to overcome *the hope* of making a positive contribution to a given cause, then lighting a match while drenched in fuel to serve as a tragic public spectacle, might consciously be assessed as productive personal behavior. Also note however that these impending dire consequences would not technically be experienced by the self which causes them, given that the main punishments should instead be borne by future selves. And presumably from a future perspective of incredible pain, *a grave mistake* should indeed become apparent.

End.))

The presented self is technically an instantaneous entity, and thus one that exists to the magnitude of sensation which is experienced at a given moment. Also, this value will be positive or negative to the degree that an associated sensation is positive or negative. But just as we generally consider our own existence over time, the concept of "self over time" should be an idea which is useful.

"Self over time" is theorized here as *the aggregate sensations which are experienced* – or essentially positive sensations over time contribute to "total personal

value," while negative sensations over time deduct. This definition reflects the idea that each moment of sensation is an individual personal entity, and therefore each must contribute its own positive/negative magnitude to this system over a specified period of time.

This approach might, for example, be contrasted with an "average" assessment. Observe the existence of two subjects with the same average level of sensation experienced, though one occurs for a year, while the other occurs for one hundred years. While *the average method* will rate each of them to have the exact same "total personal value," *the aggregate method* will rate the longer case to have one hundred times the magnitude of the shorter, whether this is positive or negative. I view this option to be superior, since each individual personal entity will fully contribute under "the aggregate assessment," though not for "the average." (In chapter 11 I will use this "aggregate sensations" idea to theorize "social welfare." Thus each positive sensation which occurs in a defined society over time will be "good for it," while each negative sensation will impart an associated deduction.)

To now pause for a quick review, the entire operation of "life" has been partitioned into classifications of *self*, and a complement that lies beyond it, or *instinct*. As the manifestation of positive/negative sensations, self will exist both to the degree and for the duration that *sensations* are experienced. Furthermore, even though a given self will not technically exist continually over time, in practice a subject may still function effectively over time, given that *memory of past sensations*, as well as *the anticipation of future sensations through "hope" and "worry,"* can bring associated *present sensations*. And finally, when the concept of self is nevertheless defined over time, an "aggregate measure of sensations" should be a useful idea, since each "individual self" will fully contribute under such an assessment.

To contrast this secondary system with its primary complement, *instinct* concerns dynamics which occur beyond the punishments and/or rewards associated with *sensations*. Hair grows, the heart beats, infections are attacked, and so on... under a system which is apparently not incited by sensations. The presented "self" is the manifestation of sensations, and sensations theoretically motivate the conscious mind. "Instinct," however, addresses all remaining aspects of existence.

((This three paragraph discussion observes that a definition for "life" is not required to support these models, and that all "alien good" should inherently be addressed here as well.

"Instinct," or "life's primary mode of operation," has been presented under an "everything beyond sensations" definition, which in turn opens the question of how "life" should be defined. I can avoid this consideration, however, by simply omitting the term "life" from this definition. So here "instinct" addresses the operation of *all reality* ("living" or not) to the extent that it isn't motivated by sensations.

Nevertheless, perhaps a definition for "life" would be useful to help describe the nature of "self." But "life" is only *presumably* required in order for sensations to be experienced. If it is indeed possible for a machine to be constructed such that it can be punished and/or rewarded, which is to say, such



that it *can experience sensations*, then the presented theory will address a personal entity "in the absence of life."

Observe that these definitions address the nature of "alien reality" as well. As noted above, *any subject* which is "punished" and/or "rewarded," regardless of where, when, or any other dimension of existence, will also contain associated "self." All such punishments and/or rewards may then be termed "sensations," and the means through which they are experienced may then be termed "consciousness."

End.))

Though *instinct* is relatively simple to describe under its "everything else" definition, *self* does still harbor various important dynamics to address. If sensations are to exist under the medium of "consciousness," then how shall this idea be defined? In order to prepare for the coming model of *human consciousness*, however, the following two chapters consider the more basic ideas of "mind" and "non-conscious mind."

[Select to open "Chapter 6" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 7: The Mind

I use a relatively broad definition to encompass *the mind* – this shall simply be an entity which "processes information." The opposite and complementary classification shall then be referred to here as "mechanical function," or operations that do not involve the processing of information. Like the self/instinct relationship, adding *mental* and *mechanical* function together address "the whole," or in either case, "all reality." With *mind* defined as "that which processes information," *mechanics* takes the default role of "all other aspects of existence."

For example, consider the operation of the now obsolete mechanical typewriter. When a letter is pressed on such a machine, an arm is forced to rise up to strike the paper. This is defined to be purely "mechanical," or "non-mental," because information is not "processed" here – a mechanical typewriter does not have an associated "mind." Pressing a key on a digital device, however, does not "directly," or "mechanically," cause an associated result. Here information from pressing a key must first be processed through a mind in order for associated operations to occur.

Also consider a plant that tends to produce more flowers as the temperature increases. If this plant is structured such that warmth increases flower production when other such conditions are met in a manner which is "direct," then it does not have a mind in this regard. Like a *star* or a *molecule*, this plant functions through purely mechanical mechanisms. But if sensory information about temperature must first be processed through an intermediate structure so that instructions may then be given to cause the production of more flowers, then the plant does indeed have "a mind" in this regard.

Under this plant scenario, also consider a valve that is set up so that an increase in temperature would open it, and thus help facilitate more flowering. Though the operation of this valve might be thought of as "processed information regarding temperature," this must actually be defined as *mechanical* rather than *mental* function. It's necessary for this information processing to be more "dynamic" – it must involve the potential for instructions to be produced which might then be interpreted such that associated results may be initiated.




From this definition I suspect that *insects* have "minds" that help in their operation, but that *microbes*, *plants* and *fungi* function exclusively through "mechanical instruments." Furthermore when there is a collective processing of information in a group dynamic, then this will illustrate mental function as well. A single "collective mind" will exist for a group of *computers*, *bees*, or *a crowd of rioting people*, to the extent that the associated "individual minds" process information for group function as a whole.

Once a mind "processes information," operations might then be implemented which are based upon the result of this processing. There are various things that the mind of a given *computer* might do once it processes information, such display a specific screen image or alter the fuel to air ratio of an engine. As for *the human mind*, however, "muscle function" is one clear instrument that it seems to have at its disposal. Muscles that drive *the heart*, *an epileptic seizure*, and *speech*, for three examples, all seem to be instructed somewhat by "the human mind."

[Select to open "Chapter 7" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 8: The Non-Conscious Mind



The above diagrams present theory from which to describe *the plant, the computer, and the human*. The plant is shown as a purely "mechanical" entity, or something that does not process information. A mind does exist in the model for *the computer*, but it's not a *conscious mind*, and thus a "sensation/self" element does not exist here. As for "the human mind," it is partitioned into *conscious* and *non-conscious* classifications. The following discussion exclusively references the non-conscious portion of the human mind. The terms "input," "processor," and "output" are used to help classify the three basic functions which seem necessary for effective mental function to occur.

We will begin with the *input* portion of the non-conscious human mind. In order to properly regulate *heart function*, for example, this mind should require a great deal of input information from which to assess, perhaps, *how much oxygen is in the blood, how much physical activity is occurring, body temperature*, and so on. For a second such example, perhaps the non-conscious human mind monitors virus and infection attacks through various "non-conscious senses," assessing their location and nature so that more effective countermeasures might be implemented. A full list of human non-conscious senses should be quite extensive. Observe that if the keyboard for the computer which I'm now using is one of just a few kinds of input to its mind, then the human non-conscious mind's presumed "countless inputs," already suggest a tool which is many orders beyond this machine.

Another identified element of the non-conscious human mind addresses a "non-conscious processor," or something that should essentially function as a computer processor does. With various inputs to "process," or "evaluate," this mechanism must essentially figure out what to do. I presume that it instructs the function of organs like the heart, helps fight virus and infection attacks, helps regulate body temperature, and so on. Beyond using the non-conscious inputs just mentioned, I suspect that it has access to inputs like "vision" which might generally be termed "conscious."

I use the term "non-conscious output" to reference *the implementation* aspect of the non-conscious human mind. For example, a specific screen image would be a non-conscious output for it. Observe that the human non-conscious mind should have muscles and organs somewhat at its disposal. Is fingernail growth a purely "mechanical" aspect of our bodies, or does the non-conscious mind help instruct this output to some degree? Regardless, a complete list of "output mechanisms" associated with the non-conscious human mind, should indeed be extensive.

When a finger becomes damaged, for example, various non-conscious senses presumably *detect this circumstance*, the non-conscious processor then *figures out what to do about it*, and one of many associated *non-conscious outputs* might be the creation of *pain*. This sensation would then be something for the conscious mind to deal with, or a dynamic that will be discussed in the next chapter.

Perhaps the non-conscious mind is generally responsible the vast majority of all mental function, simply given its basic nature. For this same reason, furthermore, perhaps "mechanics" ultimately dwarfs the role that "the mind" generally plays by a similar margin. If so then the remainder, or "the conscious mind," might be seen as a relatively minor aspect of human function. But given that consciousness has also been defined to harbor "self," it must nevertheless encompass the entire concept of "importance" – and quite regardless of any perhaps limited functional scope of what consciousness ultimately "does."

((Given that I've invented my own "non-conscious mind" term rather than rely upon the standard "unconscious mind," the following two paragraphs are presented to emphasize that I am indeed using a nonstandard concept here.

The "[unconscious mind](#)" was largely popularized through the work of [Sigmund Freud](#) in the early 20th century, though even modern definitions seem quite different from the idea which I've just presented. Wikipedia roughly defines it as *a hidden portion of consciousness which contains "repressed feelings, automatic skills, subliminal perceptions, thoughts, habits, automatic reactions, complexes," and perhaps "hidden phobias and desires."* Such an "esoteric consciousness" idea seems quite unnecessary to support my own theory however. Perhaps the questions which an unconscious mind idea was invented to answer, simply appeared useful given various foundation problems associated with these fields. Regardless, to support my own work there is simply the need for "a computer-like portion of the mind" as noted above, as well as "a conscious element" which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Nevertheless I do have one conventional use for the term "unconscious." When a person has head trauma such that consciousness has been lost, for example, it's common to say that he or she has become "unconscious" (and presumably without also visiting a world of "Freudian slips" and such). While I could refer to this person as "not conscious," or state that the non-conscious portion of the mind is now the only functioning mental element, the term "unconscious" does seem to have good flow, *and is even conventional.*


End.))

[Select to open "Chapter 8" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 9: The Conscious Mind

The term "[consciousness](#)" will now be considered well beyond the effective definition presented so far (or "medium through which existence may be experienced"). But given the many details associated with the following model, I do have one clerical observation to begin with. My general theory does not actually depend upon the accuracy of the following model, but rather just that there be "a medium through which existence becomes experienced." If the following model does prove "useful," however, this should also support my larger premise – or that the relatively *new* institution of science, will not be whole without also acquiring the relatively *old* institution of philosophy.



As the diagram above shows, one of the presented aspects of consciousness addresses a "sensations" input, which also represents the theoretical "self" or "personal entity." A list of sensations was given in the "Secondary Operation" chapter, such as *pain, jealousy, thirst, worry, confidence, fun, humor*, and so on.

I see this specific variety of conscious "input," as something that can only exist through "output" of the non-conscious mind. For example, in the last chapter it was noted that when a finger becomes damaged, non-conscious senses presumably detect this damage so that the non-conscious processor can then determine and implement an associated "output." Thus any *pain* which results from this damaged finger, which would then become "an input" for the conscious mind to deal with, would actually transpire through "output" of the non-conscious mind.

Sensations seem to vary widely in magnitude, from extremely positive to extremely negative, depending upon how various inputs are processed in both the

conscious and the non-conscious portions of the mind. Observe that while the sensation of *pain* should generally be experienced through a process where the non-conscious mind senses and reacts to body damage, the sensation of *disrespect* should first require a conscious processing of information which in turn causes the non-conscious mind to create this type of sensation. Once the non-conscious mind creates sensations of *pain*, *disrespect*, *hope*, or *any other*, the conscious mind then has associated personal incentive to figure out how to proceed.

Another category of conscious input is addressed here as "[conscious senses](#)." This is commonly recognized in the human as the ability *to see, hear, feel, taste, and smell*, though these specific senses do not encompass the entire potential spectrum of sense inputs – apparently we have certain more subtle conscious senses as well, such as "balance." Also observe that "bats" have a "[biosonar](#)" type of sense that is presumably a major conscious input for this type of creature.

As mentioned in chapter 3, though we may often consider "senses" to inherently *invoke sensations*, or even to *be sensations*, here "senses" and "sensations" are defined to reside under perfectly independent classifications of input to the conscious mind. Thus if all sensations were in some manner *removed*, a person would not inherently lose senses of *sight, hearing, touch, taste, or smell*. Nevertheless without sensations, sense information could have no positive or negative implications – a smell could not be *disgusting*, or a sound could not be *beautiful*. Here a conscious image of *red* might be sensed, for example, though it would have no potential to cause a positive or negative personal experience.

((In the following paragraph, a bit more of this speculation is presented.

Without sensations, however, what would make an "irrelevant conscious red," for example, different from the red which the non-conscious mind of a computer might sense? The difference, I think, would not be in "the red," but rather this input in respect to a fundamentally opposing variety of processor. While the non-conscious processor functions under "perfect irrelevance," the conscious processor is defined such that it does not. Therefore under a perfect sensation void, perhaps the conscious mind would not even "process" this color, and thus there wouldn't actually *be any conscious red*. At the moment we're getting too far ahead, however, since the conscious processor discussion is still to come.

End.))

We will now momentarily skip the diagram's final conscious input, or "memory," to indeed introduce the conscious processor, or "[thought](#)." I theorize that this processor both "interprets inputs" and "constructs scenarios," essentially in order to determine appropriate output, given the overriding goal of promoting positive and diminishing negative personal sensations. Thus *thought* is defined to exist in these two specific forms.

For example, consider various *sensations* and *senses* that a person might interpret while standing on a tall bridge. Any consciously interpreted *sights, smells, fears*, and so on, would demonstrate thought by means of the direct interpretation of these inputs.



*Sensing* the cold damp air, or *recognizing* a boat below, or *feeling* a squeamish kind of fear, would all represent direct "interpretation." Under this form of thought, inputs essentially become *experienced*.

Moving now to "the scenario" mode of thought, here inputs are essentially *evaluated*. If the person on this bridge were to consider the implications of falling from it, for example, observe that the inputs associated with falling would not directly be interpreted given that this event would not actually be happening. Instead associated "scenarios" would be interpreted – and perhaps by conceptualizing how falling would feel, the effects that this event might have upon friends and family, how long it would take to die after impact, and so on. Note that this line of thought might also prompt the non-conscious mind to amplify sensations of *fear*. This sensation would be interpreted "directly," however, and even when incited through "scenario" – the fear here be considered "punishment for thinking about falling."

Because *vision* is generally one of our most prominent senses, *vision interpretation* must be a common form of thought. Through this interpretation, *people, places, objects*, and so on might be "seen." This might occur directly through "sight input interpretation," or indirectly through "the scenario mode" where an image is conceptualized. In either case "thought," or "conscious interpretation," will be demonstrated.

But how then might "a sensation," such as *pain* for example, also exist through the non-experienced "scenario mode"? As I see it, this variety of thought must simply concern *the concept of a sensation*, not its actual experience. For example, "If my finger becomes damaged, then I will feel pain." This would be a scenario form of thought since it involves *a conceptual understanding* of a sensation, not its actual *experience*.

Before further discussing the conscious mind's processor, we will now move on to the only pure "output" aspect of consciousness that I've been able to identify, or "muscle operation." Note that many human muscles do accept some level of conscious mental instruction, though certainly not all. "Heart muscles," for example, seem to require non-conscious mental instruction *exclusively* – apparently it isn't generally productive for these muscles to consciously be controlled.

Though conscious muscle function is referred to here as a conscious activity, I do suspect that the non-conscious mind is responsible for the vast majority of associated mental instruction. When a hand is consciously closed, for example, observe that the details of this activity do not require much conscious understanding; we do not need to understand how each of the associated muscles contribute, or even how many muscles are being used. Because very little such understanding is required in order to consciously operate muscles, I assume that the non-conscious mind is highly involved in conscious muscle function.

With the identification of two inputs (*sensations* and *senses*), one processor (*thought*), and one output (*muscle operation*), the general theory here is that "the sensations input" represents the exclusive motivation which "drives the conscious mind."

Returning again to the conscious processor, observe "The Learned Line" which is shown in the diagram to stem from *thought*, and then enter *the non-conscious processor*. Apparently the capacity of the conscious processor is relatively limited, while non-conscious processing capacity is quite abundant. This feature is meant to represent a conduit through which conscious tasks are automatically passed over to the non-

conscious mind, effectively permitting the non-conscious processor to aid in otherwise conscious function.

For example, consider the mental requirements associated with driving a car. The conscious mind of person that has little familiarity with driving should generally demand a substantial portion of available conscious processing capacity while this is being attempted. As driving familiarity is gained, however, the non-conscious mind seems to take over progressively more of the associated processing duties. As the non-conscious mind contributes progressively more, things like driving, playing piano, and so on, should be done more effectively while leaving a conscious mind that has greater capacity for other conscious tasks.

I suspect that this "learning" is helpful in respect to most forms of conscious function. Observe that the sense of *vision* generally provides a great deal of information to potentially interpret. Without the non-conscious processor *to aid in vision interpretation*, however, many relevant elements of an image should go unnoticed. As things stand, however, we apparently do make conscious associations about the various images that we experience, and some of these associations become strong enough to be transferred to the non-conscious mental processing capacity of the mind. Thus I presume that we "learn how to see" through this conduit.

Beyond "direct" and "scenario" modes of thought, a second such distinction will now be addressed which concerns *language* and *non-language* forms. Consider *a door* that commonly swings back and forth, as well as *a cat* that observes this situation. Because the cat might envision the scenario of getting hit by the door, it might consciously decide not to sit in the door's path. I term associated thought to be only *basic* in this regard, however, because the cat presumably will not mentally verbalized this situation with a language statement such as "I must not sit next to that door, since it might hit me if I do." It will nevertheless *understand* by means of *thought*, or a term that represents "conscious interpretation."

The complementary and potentially more advanced mode in this respect, then, is defined to contain some form of *mental verbalization*. Apparently "words" are relatively basic tools that can be fit together to build ideas that are far more complex. Without them I suspect that the conscious mind lacks a medium from which to describe or potentially grasp such ideas. For example, the words that you are now reading are a verbal recording of *my thought*, and you are in turn interpreting and evaluating them through conscious mental words that reflect *thought of your own*. Without the use of some form of "conscious language," perhaps the conscious human mind does not have a means from which to construct or potentially grasp such ideas.

((In these three paragraphs, examples of a dog and a feral child are presented in order to imply the relevance of our various human languages.

From this perspective, perhaps our advanced languages did not evolve simply to help facilitate *communication between humans*, but more importantly so that relatively complex ideas might be constructed and used under a "second variety of thought" that requires a language medium such as *Spanish*, or *Mathematics*, in order for it to occur.

*The dog* should be a reasonable subject from which to consider this idea. It stems from a very social animal that clearly does have verbal communication skills. Furthermore humans have selectively bred them for thousands of years in order to promote various traits. When a trained dog is instructed by its master to "sit," he or she will presumably think and understand this term while sitting. But consider a more complex command such as "Go get help!" Though a given dog might attempt to get help when prompted in this manner, perhaps this will only be done through the general *interpretation of inputs* as well as *the construction of scenarios* associated with non-language based thought. Perhaps the language capacity of a dog does not permit this subject to grasp both the individual and combined meanings of the terms "go," and then "get," and then "help." Where does a dog's capacity for language generally end?

There are various more intelligent animals to consider in this respect as well, but perhaps the most instructive would be "[a feral child](#)." Young children are sometimes "lost into nature," though a small percentage of them do nevertheless manage to survive this way for years. Scientists therefore try to learn what they can from these subjects as they become available. Observe that as humans which lack our formal languages, they should demonstrate whether or not language has the significance which is now being suggested. Without "an advanced language" from which to construct or consider relatively complex ideas, what is the potential for such a person to nevertheless "think such things"?

End.))

"Thought" is defined here as "the processing element of the conscious mind." Nevertheless it also seems broad enough to demonstrate *output and input* characteristics. For example, when the question "How shall I get home?" is considered, this reflects a conscious processing of information in which various scenarios may be evaluated. But any "decision" which is made in this respect, such as "I'll walk home," would be *an output* of processing, or *a result*. Thus "thought" joins "muscle operation" in this respect. I term this output to be "impure," however, since this does still seem to be an act of processing itself.

To present an "impure input" illustration, consider a revelation that emerges during the conscious processing of information. For example, by means of "thought" a pilot might realize that the plane that he or she is flying will not safely reach an airport. Like a *sensation* or *sense*, this specific thought should represent a conscious input from which new conscious mental processing may be incited to occur.

Beyond "sensations" and "senses," a third (and also "pure") input to the conscious mind is presented in the diagram as "[memory](#)." This may essentially be viewed as "stored thought," or "past consciousness that remains." For example, I have various memories of being quite young, and I take this as that which remains of my consciousness during that period of my life. The more that I think about this time, the more images and events that I can recollect and potentially use. The presented model mandates that if I had done no "thinking" as a young child, and thus that there had been no consciousness as discussed, then memories would not have formed. Indeed, here there wouldn't actually be anything *to* remember.

Observe that from the presented model, *any* conscious interpretation of an input, such as an image, exists as thought itself. But what remains of a conscious interpretation just a moment later may now exist only as "stored thought," or "memory." This memory input information exists as "a recorded by-product of processing," and it's something that the processor itself might then use. When interpreted by the conscious mind, "inputs," which have been identified as *sensations, senses*, the "impure" *realization element of thought*, and now *memories* themselves, may be stored to some degree, for some period of time, and specifically under "the memory input to the thought processor."

((The paragraph here suggests that memory should be classified as an input which is "pure."

I've referred to "realization" as *input* to thought, and "decision" as *output* of thought, though each are termed *impure* in the sense that they are entirely elements of *conscious processing itself*. But now "memory" has been referred to in a similar way, but such that it's also *pure*. I make this distinction because memory does not seem helpful to classify *as an act of processing*, as "realization" and "decision" are defined, but rather as *a recording of past processing*. Like a "sense" or "sensation," this is information that the current processor may then use, and thus memory is defined here as *a third pure input* to the conscious processor.

End.))

A major element of the conscious mind will now be considered which is not presented in the diagram. Apparently consciousness may be "diminished" or "eliminated" in various ways, as well as be "restored." But I'm in a bit of a quandary regarding a name for this dynamic. While I naturally favor the term "sub-consciousness," this does come very close to the non-hyphenated "[subconsciousness](#)" term that is already used in "mental/behavioral" fields – and oral speech would not naturally distinguish them. I've decided to proceed this way regardless however. In situations where there may be confusion about which of these ideas is intended, this new term might be considered "impaired" consciousness, while the existing term might be referred to as "not quite," or even "pre" conscious.

This does give me the opportunity to momentarily address the existing term however: A woman who is about to be raped might vaguely become aware that her situation is progressively growing precarious, but without acknowledging this sufficiently enough to consciously protect herself. Thus afterwards she might say that she only "subconsciously" understood her growing danger. Furthermore, though a person may not consciously acknowledge various sensations he or she is prone to feel for someone else, such as *love, anger, lust, envy*, and so on, subsequent behavior may nevertheless reflect various "non-acknowledged sensation tendencies" somewhat. Also consider "[deja vu](#)" – perhaps when we can't decide why various circumstances seem familiar, this is sometimes because *they are indeed somewhat familiar*, though not in a "sufficiently processed" way. (The term "[subliminal inputs](#)" may also be referenced in this regard.) So rather than term dynamics such as these to be "conscious," it may be helpful to instead use a "lesser term" commonly known as "subconsciousness."

Though I find this term useful as well, I do not use it as a "secondary" or "competing" variety of consciousness, as "[new age](#)" literature commonly seems to. The consciousness dynamic is presented here as an involved process where full acknowledgement of any given conscious understanding, simply cannot be expected to occur in all cases. Therefore an associated "subconsciousness" should be present when various conscious inputs and their implications are not sufficiently processed. Observe here that the non-conscious mind might become quite prepared for the conscious mind to indeed complete such processing, and so preform related non-conscious functions, even without "a full conscious understanding." This "somewhat absent consciousness" idea might thus be useful to reference as a "subconscious" state of processing.

To now move on to a separate idea which I've given a very similar name, however, "sub-consciousness" shall be an "impaired" conscious mind which is thus "diminished," or "sub." Under a sub-conscious mental state there is the potential for somewhat reduced conscious mental activity to occur such that *input, processing, and output* aspects of the conscious mind become degraded in associated ways.

There should be some reduction in consciousness (*or increase in sub-consciousness*) when a person is "[daydreaming](#)." Light to heavy levels of "[sleep](#)," however, seem to more clearly demonstrate sub-conscious states. To the extent that "[hypnosis](#)" is a degradation of consciousness, this applies as well. Also observe that a blow to the head might "knock a person out." While this state was termed "not conscious" or even "unconscious" in the final auxiliary point from chapter 8, it now may also be referred to as "complete sub-consciousness." Furthermore various *drugs* may be used to reduce or eliminate consciousness. Observe that the consumption of alcohol seems to gradually degrade the conscious mind in a way that is widely understood to compromise *sensations, senses, memory, thought, and conscious muscle function*, as the presented model suggests it might. Since periodic "[sleep](#)" is a very common form of sub-consciousness, the conscious mental activity which occurs here will now be considered.

*Thought* has been theorized as "the direct interpretation of inputs," as well as "the construction of scenarios." Therefore the sub-conscious thought which occurs during sleep should occur in these two specific forms as well, but with an associated degraded nature. Note that a specific *sensation, sense, or memory* may be given some "direct interpretation" under the diminished consciousness of sleep. "Being poked," for example, might be interpreted directly somewhat here. Furthermore a damaged finger should be somewhat less painful while sleeping. As far as "the scenario mode" goes, however, consider our "[dreams](#)." This may be considered a scenario mode of thought that has diminished *input, processing, and output* traits. Apparently however, they may also be quite dynamic.

In the dreams which we have, observe the tendency for this "crippled processor" to invent *illogical circumstances*, as well as believe that these circumstances are happening *presently*. It would seem that this processor has trouble realizing that *it* is the source of dream circumstances (instead of the direct interpretation of conscious inputs). Given the potential for circumstances to be fabricated in dreams that are both extreme and thought to be happening *presently*, strong sensations should thus occur in dreams from time to time. But if "sub-conscious fear," for example, may be just as strong as "full conscious fear," I don't currently see that my own models explain why. (It does also

seem to me that some of my greatest sensations of fear have occurred while dreaming. so I am indeed still curious about this.)

In the lightest forms of sleep, "thought" may generally function well enough for a person to suspect that he or she is simply dreaming. Furthermore perhaps more experienced dreamers do learn to identify these states somewhat. And though heavier sleep should bring dreams that are quite difficult to identify, perhaps at deeper levels "thought" becomes impaired to the point that "dream scenarios" cease to occur at all.

In the sensations which are experienced in dreams, however, there should be at least one complete omission. Observe that dream scenarios which involve a damaged body, do not cause the non-conscious mind to produce associated pain sensations. Fortunately this processor seems to require non-conscious senses to first detect body damage before fully relying upon "dream evidence."

I presume that the potential for consciousness to be degraded into sub-conscious states, involves an inherent element of what consciousness happens to be. Nevertheless, why would periodic sleep be so universal to conscious subjects? Perhaps *sleep* doesn't just bring more effective conscious function in general, but rather *it's somehow necessary in order for consciousness to occur at all.*

This marks the final element of the conscious mind that will be presented here, and together these features are an attempt to provide a useful model of reality. I do not, however, mean to imply that each is necessary in order for consciousness itself to exist. The only feature that seems to warrant such a distinction is "thought," or the conscious processor itself. Though consciousness has been presented as a system that generally contains input and output elements, it's the processing act of "interpreting inputs" and "constructing scenarios" that I see as the *essence of consciousness itself.* But to further demonstrate the presented consciousness dynamic, this model will now be considered in the absence of each notable feature:

Without "sensations," conscious function should not just be hindered by the loss of a "standard" input, since this is also theorized as the essential motivation which drives the function of the conscious mind. In such a void "sense" and "memory" inputs might still occur, though they would also have *no relevance to a subject.* And though it should technically still be possible for "thought" to transpire here, in practice there would be no motivation from which to drive any such interpretation of inputs and/or construction of scenarios.

This opens the question of whether or not a perfect sensation void would inherently eliminate consciousness itself. This would be true if *complete irrelevance* does functionally halt all thought. But if a person who lacks all sensations does nevertheless continue to interpret inputs, such as visual images, then these would be demonstrations of "consciousness/thought" during perfect sensation voids.

Removing all "senses" from the conscious mind would leave a subject with far less information from which to consciously function. Here the only inputs left to potentially interpret would be *sensations, memory,* and also the *realization* input associated with thought. Conscious muscle "output" might still occur, though without senses from which to assess such movement, this might not generally be useful. Observe that in this state, a hungry person with food in his or

her mouth should still not know enough to actually eat this food – there would be no *touch*, *smell*, or *taste* from which to comprehend what is happening. And when conscious muscle operation does nevertheless occur, there should be virtually no information from which to suggest that it has indeed occurred – perhaps except for something like "pain" if the body becomes damaged as muscles are used.

Eliminating "thought," which is the conscious processor that "interprets inputs and/or constructs scenarios," was defined as "an elimination of consciousness itself" (and done just four paragraphs ago). Note that in this void the non-conscious mind might signal for a sensation to occur, though without "thought" there would be *no interpretation*, and thus *no sensation*. Here sensation, sense, and memory inputs would essentially have *no destination*. From this definition it's not "consciousness" that is ultimately required in order for "thought" to exist, but rather "thought" that is ultimately required in order for "consciousness" to exist. It states that *the interpretation of inputs and/or construction of scenarios, is the manifestation of consciousness itself*.

There is also "The Learned Line" to consider in this respect. If various conscious tasks *were not* "automatically contracted over to the non-conscious mental processor," then conscious processing capacity should quickly be depleted. Because human consciousness seems to depend heavily upon aid from the non-conscious processor, I suspect that there is very little that a person could otherwise consciously "do." Not only should this prevent a person from "walking while chewing gum," I think, but from standard conscious function in general.

As for thought in the absence of *language*, without "basic word elements from which to think," our ability to grasp relatively involved ideas should be quite impaired. The auxiliary "cat and feral child" discussion above demonstrates my perception of thought in the absence of language.

*Memory impairment*, both in respect to forming and accessing this "past consciousness recorded," is commonly studied. Under a perfect absence of this input, however, I suspect that the conscious mind becomes "effectively useless." Without even a moment of memory for the scenario mode of thought to use, the path behind conscious function does not seem complete.

For example, consider a box that brings great pain when a hand is inside it. It is my contention that without any capacity for *memory*, a person with a hand in this box would be perfectly unable to consciously determine and then implement a way to stop this pain. The hand might "randomly" be removed from the box, or then be put back in, but these would not demonstrate "scenario modes" from which the nature of reality may be theorized and then acted upon. Thus I assume that with a perfect absence of the memory input, the conscious mind becomes "effectively useless."

To address the only identified "pure output" of the conscious mind, a loss of "conscious muscle function" essentially represents *complete paralyzation*. This condition should be amazingly different from a loss of consciousness itself, though these two states should appear virtually the same to observers. Here a person might interpret *senses* and *sensations*, as well as *form and interpret*



*memories*. But with no conscious ability to operate muscles, existence could be "extremely frustrating," or far worse.

To address the term "subconscious," apparently it can be useful to classify our "nearly conscious understandings" under this heading, given that various conscious dynamics may not always be "fully processed." The opposite to this idea, however, would then be some kind of "perfect consciousness" such that all conscious dynamics receive "a full measure of conscious processing."

And finally there is my own "sub-consciousness" term. Note that a person without any potential for "diminished conscious states" would remain fully conscious until this is lost entirely. Thus *sleep*, *intoxication*, and other diminished forms of consciousness, would never occur.

((These three paragraphs consider the idea of having additional modes of thought/consciousness.

It may seem peculiar that the human conscious mind has not developed the ability to think about two separate things at once. Observe that while a person is silently reading a book, for example, he or she cannot also have an involved conversation – there isn't a second conscious processor from which each of these tasks might be done simultaneously. Instead, a single conscious processor must switch back and forth between such tasks, thus limiting how well each of them should be possible to do. (And note that I'm not addressing tasks which might automatically be passed over to the non-conscious processor through "The Learned Line," such as juggling some balls.) Given the potential usefulness of at least one extra mode of thought/consciousness from which to function, why do we apparently have just a single conscious processor?

To consider this idea further, perhaps each of these "proposed conscious processors" would focus specifically upon the inputs associated with its own current task, such as *reading a book* or *having a conversation*. And perhaps sensations would generally be experienced mutually, thus aligning the interests of these separate processors. A high level of cooperation should be required between these separate modes of thought/consciousness in order to generally promote the interests of a shared self.

Beyond any complexities associated with the addition of a second conscious processor, however, I suspect that there has been too much potential for conflict between them in order for this to generally evolve. Perhaps in order to work together productively, each processor would need to make compromises that ultimately diminish total functionality. Regardless, it does appear that the ability to consciously think about *one thing at a time* has proven more effective than *two*, or at least for the human.

End.))

((Since I do not use an "unconscious mind" idea in my own work, these three paragraphs consider how this traditional concept might nevertheless be placed here.



"Wikipedia's" current definition for "[the unconscious mind](#)" might be considered esoteric portion of consciousness which contains "*repressed feelings, automatic skills, subliminal perceptions, thoughts, habits, automatic reactions, complexes,*" and perhaps "*hidden phobias and desires.*" So to begin my "learned line" seems to address the automatic elements of this, since here the non-conscious mind aids the conscious processor in "learned ways."

Furthermore various "general unconscious mind dynamics" do seem reasonably well represented under my basic consciousness model. Given that sensations of "shame," "embarrassment," and so on may indeed be experienced, the need for some kind of "hidden conscious realm" from which to explain *repressed sexual desires*, for example, should not be required.

The traditional unconscious mind might also be associated with my own "sub-conscious" state of consciousness. When a person is *asleep* or *drunk*, for two examples, from my definitions consciousness has been diminished such that *inputs, processing, and outputs* become impaired in associated ways. Thus "dreams" have been defined here as the diminished thought/consciousness that can occur under "standard sub-conscious sleep." A more traditional theorist, however, might instead assert that "[the dream](#)" can be useful to view as a gateway to a theorized "unconscious" portion of the mind.

End.))

((These seven paragraphs begin with something which is commonly referred to as "the mind body problem," but then move on to address our own potential to "engineer happiness."))

The concept of a "[mind body problem](#)" is not, from my own definitions, a literal way to describe what's generally being asked here. Observe that the phone in my pocket was designed and built by humans, so this specific "mind/body" should be understood quite well by some. From my own definitions this question might instead be expressed as "What creates consciousness?" Though I believe that I've built a useful model of the dynamics of human consciousness, I'm perfectly ignorant of what it would take to practically develop something with such input, processing, and output elements. Furthermore I have no more curiosity about this than I have about my phone's engineering, and perhaps somewhat because I doubt that humanity will *ever* design and build its own conscious subjects.

Apparently the process of evolution has indeed mastered such engineering, however. My theory regarding how a "consciousness/self" dynamic might have been a useful complement to "instinct," was presented in the first discussion of the auxiliary chapter four.

But to nevertheless consider this "consciousness problem" somewhat, it's certainly appropriate to assume that from the "physical" perspective which I do hold, all [dualistic](#) explanations seem little more than convenient ways to bring "*non-physical,*" (or "[supernatural](#)") notions to science. And though it is quite common for humanity to resort to such explanations in order to explain that which is not understood, in my opinion the scientist/philosopher must never do so

"lightly." Given humanity's relatively extreme ignorance regarding reality, I for one will always remain content to theorize models which do not depend upon "magic." Though I can't actually "know" that supernatural phenomenon *do not occur*, I can still plainly observe that *science itself becomes "obsolete" to the extent that this does indeed occur*. To me this "consciousness problem" is nothing more than a standard demonstration of human ignorance regarding physical dynamics.

Furthermore, (and quite regardless of my own suspicions) perhaps humanity ultimately *will* design and build subjects which have the potential to be "punished" and/or "rewarded." As "mediums through which sensations are experienced," here we would actually manufacture consciousness. Note that our "consciousness problem" would then presumably be resolved, and quite regardless of whether "*physical*" or "*duelist*" dynamics were to become vindicated.

With our abilities to "build conscious subjects," however, notice that we conceivably might then develop countless "computer chip selves" which each experience perpetual pleasures that surpass our own potential for *pain* – and in this manner perhaps substantially contribute to "the welfare of existence in general." But if so, would we then actually *be this noble*? Perhaps... though my own theory does suggest that each of us would ultimately just attempt to use this technology in order to promote our own happiness.

Even without actually "building conscious machines," however, perhaps we will ultimately develop effective ways to monitor the "electrochemical dynamics presumably associated with sensations. With this tool perhaps we would then find some kind of "bug" that naturally has tremendous potential capacity for positive sensations, or can at least be so altered genetically. Thus we might then create countless environments which each contain billions of these "extremely happy bugs." But if so, how extensively would we actually invest in this "good for existence in general"? Once again, my theory suggests that this would only be done to the degree that we think it will promote our own happiness.

And finally, what if we ultimately learn to "medically induce" tremendous magnitudes of happiness for existing humans to experience? This scenario would have far greater human implications than the others, I think. From here I see the two essential questions as: "Which of us shall be permitted to receive such *perfect existence*?" as well as "How long would these states effectively be maintained?" In practice however, I would suspect answers of "very few of us," and "not very long."

End.))

[Select to open "Chapter 9" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Chapter 1: Introduction."](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 10: Empathy and Theory of Mind Sensations

One of the traditional arguments against the variety of theory which is presented here, is that it does not address apparent examples of "selfless acts." If *personal relevance* is completely based upon *personal sensations*, and thus we are fundamentally "selfish" in this respect, then why are apparent sacrifices for others commonly observed? I often attribute such behavior to our "empathy." Furthermore sensations commonly associated with "theory of mind" will be addressed here, and they may conform with or oppose any apparent "non-selfishness." Each of these instruments are theorized to be sensation based, however, so they actually conform with my theory. But to begin with "empathy," I suspect that this emerged out of the need for evolution to facilitate more effective parenting in relatively advanced forms of conscious life. Thus the parenting dynamic in general shall be the first topic here.

For perfectly instinctive subjects there is no potential for the parenting of young to conflict with personal interests, and this is mandated since there are no personal interests here. "Robot parents," if you like, will operate to the specifications of their mental/mechanical dynamics, without any potential for punishing/rewarding sensations to occur.

Once "conscious parents" are considered, however, there does exist the potential for productive parenting functions to conflict with personal interests. A parent such as this might be *hungry*, for example, and thus have this incentive to feed itself instead of its young. In fact, here there should even be reason for offspring to simply be *eaten*. So how might evolution deal with the conflicts which should naturally arise when there is the need for conscious life to oversee and promote the development of offspring, given the potential for conflicting personal interests to exist?

One method must be to rely upon "instinct," and thus sentient life may in this way *be compelled* to preform parenting functions. Here offspring might be given *protection, nourishment, education*, and so on, through a mechanism that the parent has no conscious control over.

Beyond "instinct," another such mechanism must be to make certain standard parenting activities "feel good," and/or not doing them "feel bad." This would create a personal incentive to perform specific types of parenting functions. For example, if maintaining offspring hygiene generally helps promote genetic welfare, then this could evolve to become an enjoyable activity for an associated parent – here there would be reason to consciously devise effective ways to promote the hygiene of offspring. With this tool an assortment of standard parenting activities might be addressed – perhaps regarding offspring *nutrition, safety, education*, and so on.

But observe that the parent's conscious mind here should still not be used to devise and implement ways to promote offspring welfare *in a general sense*, given that offspring should still essentially be *irrelevant to it*. The theme might be something like "I enjoy cleaning you, feeding you, protecting you, and so on, but nothing more. *If you suffer*, for example, my understanding of this will not harm me, and this is because I'm actually *indifferent to you*."

The way that evolution seems to have invoked the tool of conscious thought for the promotion of offspring welfare in a general sense, was to create "empathy" – or a dynamic by which *perceptions of offspring sensations, cause somewhat corresponding*

*parental sensations*. Here perceptions that offspring is *in pain*, or *in danger*, or *healthy*, will tend to invoke somewhat conforming parental sensations – and thus give a parent this incentive to consciously plan and implement ways to promote offspring welfare in a general sense. So perhaps empathy emerged in order for "thought" to generally be used for parenting purposes – and I presume, long before the existence of anything similar to "the human."

To specifically address *human empathy*, however, this seems to have become a very prominent element of what we are — and perhaps given our highly social nature. Thus we do not simply observe empathetic sensitivity for *parent to child*, but also for *child to parent*, *family member to family member*, *friend to friend*, and so on. In fact, apparently perceptions of sensations in perfectly anonymous *people*, *animals*, and even *plants* and *machines*, have the potential to incite strong personal empathetic sensations as well.

Consider for example how much less entertaining movies and television programs would often be, if the sensations which anonymous actors portray did not also invoke personal sensations for viewers to experience. Without providing information which is otherwise significant to us, the various circumstances which actors portray might thus seem quite irrelevant. But given our general empathy, situations which depict the sensations of others *do* commonly seem to be personally significant, and presumably because our perceptions of the sensations of others generally cause us somewhat conforming empathetic sensations.

((This paragraph observes that "empathy" can only be based upon *perceived* sensations, not *actual* sensations.))

Since actors often just "act," this profession demonstrates that it's not the sensations of others that directly cause conforming sensations for observers to experience, but rather just an observer's *perception of those sensations*. Observe that if you have no information about your child's present circumstances, for example, then the sensations which he or she experiences will not directly cause an empathy effect in you, and quite regardless of the magnitude of your child's actual sensations. This seems to explain why it can be effective for those who fight animal cruelty, for example, to display graphic examples of mistreated animals. Because such sensations do not directly impart negative sensations for others to experience (and these animals may certainly be caged up well out of public view) it may also be helpful to illustrate this suffering in order to gain support by means of observer empathy.

End.))

To now move beyond empathy, there also seems to be a dynamic which can function in *the opposite manner*, or such that *positive sensations* may be experienced through perceptions of *negative sensations in others*, as well as *negative sensations* through perceptions of *positive sensations in others*. I do not refer to this as "anti-empathy," however, since it seems to often emerge through standard "theory of mind" dynamics. Furthermore this also seems to function such that *it does correspond with empathy*. The

"[theory of mind](#)" term will be used here, as it commonly is, to represent perceptions that one conscious entity has about what another conscious entity happens to be *thinking*.

Apparently accurate theory about the thoughts of others (which is to say, *accurate theory of mind*) can be useful in a general sense. If I had a better understanding of your specific thoughts, I would presumably be able to devise better arguments from which to convince you of my beliefs, for example, or even have an advantage if we were to play a game of *Poker*. But once there is theory about the thoughts of others, how might perceptions of positive/negative views of *us personally* be dealt with? Here it seems that the non-conscious mind takes these perceptions as evidence of *personal health*. With signs that we are being judged in *positive/negative ways*, our non-conscious minds seem to create corresponding positive/negative sensations for our conscious minds to deal with. Furthermore, apparently this also occurs when we make such judgments *of ourselves*. Observe that we enjoy being *proud*, while sensations of *shame* can feel very negative. (Though a "theory of mind" title may not technically be appropriate for personal assessments, I nevertheless classify this here as well.)

There are many ways in which positive/negative judgments of others and ourselves can be made. One might be perceived as *smart*, or *the opposite, beautiful*, or *the opposite, thin*, or *the opposite, strong*, or *the opposite, friendly*, or *the opposite, honest*, or *the opposite, fragrant*, or *the opposite, charitable*, or *the opposite, humorous*, or *the opposite*, and so on. With evidence that such positive/negative assessments are being made about us, our non-conscious minds seem to create associated sensations for our conscious minds to deal with.

For example, if I perceive that others consider me to be "an idiot," or if I happen to make such assessments of myself, this should generally cause me associated negative sensations. Here my non-conscious mind is theorized to inflict a lesson of punishment to consciously experience, given this "evidence of my weakness." Thus I generally strive to behave in ways which suggest, both to myself and to others, *that I'm not indeed an idiot*. In practice these positive/negative sensations set up a dynamic where there is competition to be viewed against others in favorable ways. Thus there may be reason for one person to insult another person, essentially in order to benefit from theory of mind sensations to the theme of "I am better than you."

Consider the progression of a child that begins life in a supportive and happy family. Observe that even here the child should experience sensations of "disrespect" from time to time as various family rules are enforced. Some situations may thus cause anger and shouting from the child, while others may bring crying from sadness, or perhaps shame. During these situations, theoretically the child's non-conscious mind is inflicting lessons of punishment to consciously experience through associated theory of mind penalties. Then later in a "school yard environment," where there will presumably be far less "law," the child may quickly learn that friendships and alliances can be very important to help promote theory of mind interests. Here a given alliance may find reason to generally display disrespect for various rivals, essentially in order to reap associated theory of mind rewards. And though maturity does often seem to at least bring greater civility, this should simply mask the underlying dynamics of our nature. Whether in *a corporate office, a specific family, among strangers*, or even *in perfectly isolation*, theory of mind rewards and penalties do often seem to be a significant source of

sensations. Here there is general reason to "gain respect," both from others and ourselves.

I do not mean to imply, however, that "a winner" inherently requires there to be "a loser" in this regard. Apparently it is quite possible for there to be "mutual respect between subjects" such that positive theory of mind sensations flow back and forth. Here subjects may essentially "build from the strengths of each other." Notice that certain families are very supportive in this regard, and thus reap these benefits in a general sense, while others remain quite mired in negative theory of mind strife.

Also consider two men that are very good friends. What might happen if one of them were to marry a woman that they each perceive to be, in all regards, *extremely attractive*? I do not see "jealousy" to be an inherent theory of mind issue, given that this sensation might occur regardless of the man's perceptions of what his married friend thinks. Notice that there need not even *be* another man here – simple interactions with this woman could bring a yearning desire for her, and even if she is indeed available. Perhaps here we could call it jealousy of *her*, though it might just as well be jealousy of *a home, a car, a job*, or anything else that one might desire.

To nevertheless consider the "theory of mind" elements to this situation, however, the married man has this reason to "feel superior" to his friend, and thus his non-conscious mind should reward him with positive sensations somewhat in this regard. Conversely the friend should feel associated sensations of "inferiority." If this friend also has "general insecurities," perhaps he will try to suggest that he isn't actually bothered in the attempt reduce this effect. If he is "quite secure," however, he might openly state "Damn it man... your hot wife is killing me!"

Apparently our standard empathetic tendencies, which naturally help align personal interests with the interests of others, have significant potential to be overcome by opposing theory of mind sensations. Thus a person might, for example, *attack his or her spouse*. These attacks may often be signs that empathy has been overcome by the desire to halt negative theory of mind sensations like *shame, embarrassment, disrespect*, and so on.

Also note that there seems to be significant potential for signs of *animosity from others*, to ironically be interpreted by the non-conscious mind as signs of *positive personal health* – which should in turn cause *positive personal sensations*. Not only might a business owner or the dictator of a country enjoy dominating various subjects of control, for example, but a sports fan might find satisfaction through a bitter rivalry with fans from competing clubs. Apparently associated animosity is taken as "respect," and thus the non-conscious mind imparts positive sensations when various "disadvantaged competitors" express their animosity. This dynamic should also tend to make "the disadvantaged" feel somewhat worse.

Returning once again to "empathy," however, apparently we aren't just tied to others through our understanding of their sensations, but we also desire perceptions that others have empathy *for us* – apparently we both *love others*, as well as *desire the love of others*.

Consider a child that is spanked by a parent for disobedience. This should bring both *pain* as well as *a theory of mind demonstration of weakness*. For a third such penalty, however, this situation may also show that the parent both "understands and



condones" the child's negative sensations. Such demonstrations that a parent's empathy is weaker than presumed, I think, can incite very negative sensations as well.

Children might essentially be viewed as "weak humans." *Crying*, which seems incited by negative sensations, might be thought of as an instinctive mechanism from which to invoke the empathy of those that are more dominant. But when there is evidence that no such empathy exists, this seems to also incite negative sensations, and theoretically because empathy is something that *we naturally desire others to have for us*. Perhaps this is often understood, as illustrated when a parent plainly shows his or her child how difficult it is to inflict punishments. To the extent that the child believes that the parent will also be harmed here, there should at least be this comfort. Though the punishment may still occur, this child should be somewhat protected through a greater perception of parental love.

Also consider both the empathy and theory of mind implications associated with *insults*. A girl that is generally perceived to be quite unattractive may learn to accept her associated inferior status, and in this manner not perpetually feel so negative about this circumstance. But when an associated malicious taunt is directed at her, and possibly by someone that she *respects* and/or *loves*, there should be something more than just new evidence of a problem that she may already be quite aware of. A "lack of empathy" effect should play an additional role in the negative sensations which she experiences, and with increased effect when greater levels of relieved upon empathy become more questionable. Beyond the expected general theory of mind effect that a perfectly unknown attacker should impart, perhaps an apparent lack of empathy effect does commonly occur as well.

So a question that I leave you with here is... does the human display a sufficiently selfishness nature from which to validate the perfectly selfish presented ideology, at least given my inclusion of both *empathy* and *theory of mind* sensations?

((This five paragraph discussion notes the potential for "human studies" to be compromised by "human biases," given that we have no "nonhuman theorists" that might thus be more objective observers of us than ourselves.

One issue that "mental/behavioral" sciences will always need to battle, I think, is that because we are human, it can inherently be difficult for us to consider human reality from relatively objective positions. Apparently our beliefs become "tinted" by both *empathy* and *theory of mind* based sensations, as well as *sensations in general*. Thus a scientist's ability to develop useful models of human reality, should also depend somewhat upon his or her ability to objectively acknowledge and account for various personal sensations.

I enjoy watching nature shows, for example, though my respect for a given program will diminish when I perceive various standard human biases. Observe that these programs commonly seem to "justify" the cruelties which exist in the natural world. When a mother bird permits a weak chick to be killed by its siblings, for example, this demonstrates a very callous event from a standard human perspective. But these programs commonly attempt to "explain" such behavior, I presume, in order to encourage us to not hate the offenders. A more

objective assessment might instead observe that *a given subject may indeed be quite horrible to another*, and as these birds suggest, *well beyond the human*.

Also observe that these programs commonly attempt to "shame us" into preserving the Earth's ecosystem from the many changes that modern humanity is making. Because we are progressively displacing various species of life (which does presumably include future humanity), and because "nature" is also widely presumed to be "good," these shows are an excellent way to convey this "humanly biased message."

Apparently *the scientist*, who is no less human than *the nature show host*, must develop theory from which to understand exactly how his or her views are "naturally tinted" in order to help account for such potentially distorting influences. Once there is accepted theory which describes the biological nature of "good," (and I presume dynamics like "empathy" and "theory of mind" sensations), it should be more possible for "mental/behavioral" scientists to remove their proverbial "human tinted glasses," and thus gain somewhat more accurate perceptions of reality.

To also inject some self-reflection here, I am quite aware that my own work is mainly driven by "theory of mind based sensations." Observe that to the extent which my ideas are able to gain prominence, the standing of certain traditional scientists and philosophers should diminish — and so I would reap various theory of mind rewards at their expense. Thus my associated sensations of "hope" have also made my work quite enjoyable. But have these sensations also influenced me to overstate the potential importance of my ideas? Therefore I must attempt to be as objective as possible in this regard, given my various biases.

End.))

[Select to open "Chapter 10" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)



## Chapter 11: The Social Entity and Subject Identification

I've now presented a mechanism through which the personal entity may effectively "expand" to encompass the welfare of others – *empathy* can indirectly do this in the sense that our perceptions of the sensations which others experience, can bring us personal sensations as well. Furthermore, *theory of mind varieties of sensation* can have both opposing and conforming relevance in the sense that our non-conscious minds may *punish or reward us* through our perceptions of how we are perceived by others and ourselves. To this point, however, the essential focus of this discussion has simply been *the personal entity*. The only true "social scenario" presented so far was an auxiliary chapter four reference to "*the aggregate sensations of life over time*" (which is an idea that will again be addressed here). Personal dynamics have been emphasized to this point, since the nature of the personal entity should be established before combinations of personal entities may properly be considered. We will now move on to "the social entity," however, and thus formally consider the nature of "social good."

*The personal entity* has been defined specifically as the sensations which a given subject experiences. This is technically presented to be *instantaneous*, since a subject does not directly experience past or future sensations. Nevertheless "memory of the past" and "anticipation of the future" seem to bring *present sensations*, or something that effectively "expands the self" in this respect. Thus we apparently do perceive continuous self, even though this perception may technically be considered an illusion.

Also, the self over time has been defined as *the aggregate sensations compiled by associated instantaneous personal entities*. This "aggregate" compilation of individual personal entities should be a useful idea, since it permits each moment of sensation to impart its own specific magnitude to a given subject over time.

It is from this last specific idea that the concept of "social good" will now be built. If "personal good over time" is defined by adding positive personal sensations, as well as deducting the negative, then "social good over time" shall be defined in quite the same way, though regarding the sensations of *two or more such entities*. Thus a policy which generally promotes the happiness of two or more individuals will be *good* for this society (or "subject"), and to the specific degree that the policy promotes the aggregate quantity/quality of these experienced sensations over a given period of time.

As mentioned, a social scenario was presented in the second discussion of the auxiliary chapter four. If aggregate negative sensations for "all future life on Earth" will ultimately be greater than these aggregate positive sensations, then *nonexistence* would benefit this enormous future society as a whole, and to the exact degree of this discrepancy. Thus if a great meteor were to instead hit our planet to quickly terminate what would otherwise be a very long and horrible compilation of future sensations, then this event would be "good" for this subject as a whole. (Note: In chapter four I had not yet presented *a social model of good*, or even chapter six's *aggregate sensations theory of personal good*. At that point I simply left this specific idea to be presumed.)

Now that this social model has formally been presented, however, it will be used to help demonstrate the following point: Given the vast number of personal and social subjects that any specific argument of "good" might conceivably take, each such argument will require a unique subject from which to be based. In all cases where a

specific subject is not *stated* or at least *understood*, an associated argument will remain "functionally incomplete."

I view this subject identification condition to be a major reason that the "[Ethics](#)" branch of "[Philosophy](#)" has not yet developed any generally accepted theory (...which is not to imply that other varieties of philosophy have been superior). My general perception here is that a *good* will be identified from a given ideology, and perhaps even regarding a specific subject. But then a *conflicting good* will tend to be presented, though regarding a *separate subject*. Apparently it's been perceived that ideologies which contain such conflicting demonstrations of *good*, must not be "valid." Conversely from my own perspective, *the good of separate subjects need not correspond*. Indeed, we should expect that the interests of separate subjects would naturally diverge somewhat, simply given they are not indeed the same.

In the chapter four scenario as mentioned, observe that if existence does ultimately represent a horrible sensation based tragedy for future life on Earth in general, then this is still just one subject out of countless potential others that might be considered. If "life on Earth" were to continue there would presumably still be a great society of individuals that would experience anywhere from marginal to tremendous happiness during the course of their existence. So for *this separate subject*, the termination of life would be a great tragedy, and even if it would be better for life in general if the much larger subject (which does still include "the happy") did not exist.

To practically demonstrate one apparent "subject identification error" in the field of philosophy, consider a prominent argument against the just presented *aggregate sensations model of social good*. This objection was given in 1984 by [Derek Parfit](#), a distinguished English philosopher. Apparently in a traditional sense I may be classified as a "[total utilitarian](#)," and this places my theory squarely on the wrong side of Dr. Parfit's "[Mere Addition Paradox](#)," or "[Repugnant Conclusion](#)."

Dr. Parfit observed that from the presented Utilitarian premise, a huge society in which each member experiences sensations that are only slightly positive, is defined to be "more good" than a much smaller society where each member experiences extremely positive sensations, as long as the total magnitude of these strong sensations fall short of those which exist in the much larger but weak sensationed society. Furthermore from this perspective, a huge society where members experience only *mildly negative sensations* would be worse than a much smaller society where members experience *amazingly horrible forms of torture*, as long as the compiled strong sensations do not reach the magnitude of the compiled slightly negative sensations of the much larger society.

From here Dr. Parfit apparently reasoned that it would be "good" for us to essentially breed countless people with marginal levels of happiness rather than a more manageable number of extremely happy people. Given his assertion that such implications may only be deemed "repugnant," he apparently then assumed that this ideology cannot be an accurate description of reality.

Regardless of any sensations of repugnancy which a given observer might experience, however, his conclusion does violate my subject identification rule. Here we have two separate subjects with competing interests in the sense that if one happy society exists, then the other happy society does not exist (and similar assessments can be made for the negative scenario.) But because we are discussing *unique subjects*, his logic does

seem to fail – *the good of one subject need not conform to the good of another*. Once a subject is defined, it's only the welfare of *this entity* that is up for consideration. And while an assortment of subjects may be addressed in a given discussion, *each such "good"* must always have a distinctly separate classification.

To take the presented idea to a much greater extreme than Dr. Parfit's scenario, notice that an only marginal and momentary bit of happiness for one person, should not be sacrificed from this perspective to cause the endless ecstasy of millions. *The endless ecstasy of millions* would obviously have far greater magnitude, though if this society is not the subject of consideration, then there will be no inherent relevance to the true specified subject. Observe that if the individual in question does make this very minor sacrifice which greatly benefits a given society as mentioned, then by definition this will be "bad for him or her," and specifically to the (admittedly weak) *magnitude of surrendered positive sensation*. When the subject is instead "the society," however, then that minor sacrifice would be *amazingly good for this defined subject*, and to the exact degree of "perpetual ecstasy that millions will thus experience."

Instead of comparing separate subjects from a given ideology and then finding a term such as "repugnancy" from which to assess any discrepancies between them, Dr. Parfit might have simply observed that a great assortment of potential subjects exist, and that each harbors its own associated interests. If "subject identification errors" have been as widespread as I believe they have, this should help explain why philosophers have not been able to develop generally accepted theory regarding "the good/bad dynamic" so far.

((The paragraph here is another example of the "general" or "non-subject-specific" exploration which I believe has greatly hindered progress in philosophy.

Consider the following assertion of [Jeremy Bentham](#), or the long departed philosopher that is often credited with "inventing [Utilitarianism](#)." He essentially asserted that "right" is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Though our theories do each endorse the same essential ideology, I nevertheless disagree with this specific statement. In my view "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is only useful to perceive as "the greatest good," or that which is "right," for a given society as a whole. Other defined subjects, both inside and outside of any specified subject, will have their own associated interests, and according to my theory these interests are based upon "the instantaneous sensations which the associated personal entities experience." So instead of looking for a concept which is "generally good," I believe that philosophers must look for the good of specified subjects from various potentially useful ideologies, so that a theory which does seem consistent with observation, might ultimately achieve acceptance among scientists in general.

End.))

To now continue on with the ideas of Dr. Parfit, by using the term "repugnant" he also raised the question of whether or not it's possible for the realities of *good* to also be *distasteful*. But perhaps the scenario which he presented was a bit "subjective." *I personally* do not perceive "great quantities of mildly positive sensations" to be

inherently inferior to "small bits of extremely positive sensations," for example. Nevertheless, apparently it's not difficult to find implications of my own "[total utilitarianism](#)," *which are repugnant to virtually all*. But if such unfortunate implications do indeed exist, would this mandate that I've built "a non-useful" model of reality? Let's take a look...

We know that there are people who experience a great deal of *anger* in their lives, and presumably these punishing sensation are caused by the circumstances of their existence. People under desperate conditions may thus find greater reason to *lie, steal, hurt, or kill* others in order to help make themselves feel better in various ways which are associated with their poor circumstances. I also presume that there are people who lack any capacity for *empathy*, whether this is through "environmental" or "genetic" reasons. Furthermore apparently certain men are inclined to *rape children*, perhaps often somewhat due to unfortunate sexual desires.

The ideology which is presented here states that "when a sensation experiencing entity promotes its positive and/or diminishes its negative personal sensations, then this is inherently *good for it*." Thus the instantaneous personal entities which a man experiences while raping or otherwise harming a child, will be good for him to the extent that his associated positive sensations surpass his associated negative sensations. So if this man is not sufficiently *punished* for such behavior, whether through *social prosecution, remorse, or anything else*, then this event may end up being good for him aggregately over the course of his life, given the associated sensations which he experiences.

Social considerations may be considered here as well. Presumably this rape will be negative for a society which includes both the man and the child, and specifically to the extent that the child's associated negative sensations surpass the man's associated positive sensations. Societies in general obviously have reason to discourage such behavior, perhaps through *legal threats*, perhaps through *greater surveillance*, perhaps through *testing so that fetuses with genes which tend to bring such unfortunate sexual tenancies may be terminated*, and so on.

But it isn't mandated from the premise here that a given rape will *always* be negative to a given society. If the raped child is not included in the definition of "one arbitrary society," for example, then *this* social good could shift somewhat in the direction of an included rapist that does now happen to be more happy. Perhaps a given child that is not actually harmed by the man, will still go on to experience a long life of extremely negative personal existence, and also hurt many others along the way. But if the man were to instead kill this child in such a way that the child experiences no negative sensations, and perhaps only then to rape the dead body, then this act might end up being positive for the man (if he *does* ultimately enjoy this), for the child (if he/she *is indeed spared* from an existence which would otherwise be quite miserable), and for the larger society in general (if the full social negatives that this child would otherwise inflict, *will now go unrealized*). So under these specific parameters, the presented theory shows a positive result for each of these subjects. But given such *amazingly repugnant implications*, does this prove that the presented ideology cannot be an accurate description of reality? Shall we make the assumption that Dr. Parfit seems to have made, or that "good" must inherently be "non-repugnant"?

*Once again*, however, the stated subject identification condition does suggest otherwise. Notice that competing interests should naturally bring somewhat repugnant

implications to one side, *whenever the interests of another side prevails*. Thus it should be difficult to demonstrate that "good" must inherently be "non-repugnant," *and from my own ideology or any other*, perhaps unless it's actually found that the interests of all subjects do always correspond perfectly with all others. But even in a situation where each associated subject does find a specific example of good to be *extremely repugnant*, is this a sufficient premise from which to dismiss the presented model? Here I would suggest that our perceptions of reality, which may indeed involve "the repugnancy sensation," need not be the deciding factor given the entire spectrum of sensations which may be experienced.

((This paragraph demonstrates my position on the terms "ethics" and "morality."))

"Ethics" and "morality" are commonly substituted for the term "good" itself, even though from an academic perspective *ethics* is often interpreted as "Philosophy's discipline for determining good," while *morality* may be considered "a general code of good." I'm also quite comfortable using these terms under their common interpretations however. If you choose to harm someone for personal gain, it may then be useful to classify you as "immoral" or "unethical." And is it possible for the human to behave in such ways? Of course. But can this kind of behavior also be "good" for a given subject? This would depend upon the definition of "good" which happens to be used. Observe that if there is some kind of "afterlife" where a subject is highly punished for such behavior, then perhaps not. From my own "mortal theory," however, it does seem quite possible for "immoral/unethical" behavior to also benefit a given subject in an ultimate sense.

End.))

((In these four paragraphs, "good and evil" are considered as opposed to the "good and bad" terms which have exclusively been used here.))

My perspective on "good and evil" is relatively standard in the sense that they are defined to only exist to the extent that behavior is "freely chosen." For example, if I violently kill someone, and do so "with a perfect freedom of choice," it may then also be useful to consider me "evil" in this respect. But if I'm instead perfectly compelled to do this (and perhaps even fight the people who squeeze a knife into my hand and force it into a victim's body) I will then display "no evil nature," even though this event might still be termed "bad."

In my own work I do not use the *good and evil* terms because they seem to only exist the extent that an observer's perspective happens to be "limited"... while I seek to describe "ultimate reality." The larger that an observer's perspective happens to be, the more *reasons* which should be seen to motivate a given example of behavior. Thus from a "perfect perspective," our freedom/good/evil potential should logically disappear.

Though this reasoning may generally be somewhat clear, perhaps many "give up on it" rather than follow it to its conclusion – and in turn just assume that we have an inherent capacity to behave in "ultimately good" and "ultimate evil"

ways. Note here that I happen to assume that reality is "perfectly physical," and therefore I perceive existence to be "perfectly [deterministic](#)." If existence thus transpires exclusively through [cause and effect](#) dynamics, then future reality must occur exactly as it does occur – millions of years from now a given event must happen exactly as it does, perfectly based upon the preceding physical circumstances which reality perpetually mandates. For "physical determinists" like myself, the thought that "the human" might alter a reality which otherwise functions through "cause and effect dynamics," is simply contrary to our perception of how existence functions.

One prominent challenge to this perspective concerns popular interpretations of the [Heisenberg Uncertainty Principal](#) – or essentially that the existence of "an ultimately specific reality," is also "not accurate." My own interpretation of this principal, which simply references "human ignorance," is far less popular (though it was indeed taken by the great [Albert Einstein](#)). I can still observe, however, that all attempts to use Heisenberg's principal "as a medium through which the human becomes perfectly free to choose behavior," *seem amazingly ridiculous!* Regardless, there should be little harm of using the concept of "good and bad" rather than "good and evil," since this idea does not depend upon the highly suspect concept of "ultimate human freedom."

End.))

[Select to open "Chapter 11" blog page.](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## Chapter 12: A Concise Recap

Ch1. The essential nature of "good" is a question that must have confounded philosophers from our very beginning. I nevertheless reason that this "personal relevance" element of our nature should concern a basic aspect of what we are – or an idea which "mental/behavioral" sciences will need to theorize in order to gain a solid foundation from which to effectively do such work.

In chapter two the concept of *perfect irrelevance* is considered, followed by the opposite idea in chapter three, or theory which addresses the essential nature of *personal relevance*, or *good and bad*. Fortunately we are well equipped to build such models. With an extensive list of situations which seem "positive to us," as well as "negative," the element which is ultimately common to each situation will give us theory of that which is "personally relevant," or "good/bad" for the human. From my own list, which includes *pain, frustration, remorse, hope, fun, beauty, itchiness, love, loneliness, shame, and so on*, "sensations" are theorized as the essence of "personal relevance" or "self." This theory is then taken as *a given element of the discussion*, permitting various associated dynamics to be considered for the remainder.

Chapter four is "auxiliary," and begins by considering why sensations may have evolved. Here it's theorized that sensations might not only have "simplified" evolution's programming by "subcontracting" some of this over to a consciousness mode, but did so in a way that effectively promotes functionality by addressing "unforeseen challenges." Furthermore in this chapter's second discussion a scenario which references "tragic existence" is considered. If the total magnitude of all future negative sensations will surpass the total magnitude of all future positive sensations, then from my theory, *nonexistence* would indeed benefit this enormous future society in general.

In the auxiliary chapter five it is argued that we must not look for "true definitions," since there are none. Our definitions simply "model reality" – just try sitting on the term "chair," for example. Thus a scientist who uses a term such as "is" for definition, (like "What *is* time?" for example) has already failed in this respect. Instead he or she must acknowledge a freedom from which to define any term any way at all, with no potential to be "wrong" or "right." The scientist's great challenge is rather to develop "useful definitions" in the quest to build models of reality which do appear to correspond with observation.

Ch.6. Apparently our sensations have fluctuating degrees of magnitude, and therefore "self" has been defined to have corresponding levels of existence. Thus "more self" is defined to occur as sensations become more extreme. Also, given that *current sensations* are all that may be experienced each moment, "self" has been defined to be *instantaneous*. Nevertheless self should still appear continuous to us by means of our *memory of the past* and *anticipation of the future*, given their present sensation implications. Note that in the *anticipation conduit*, "hope" and "worry" are the basic factors which cause *a perceived future* to have personal relevance. When self is nevertheless considered *over time*, however, an "aggregate compilation of sensations" should be a useful idea, since each instantaneous personal entity will impart its own associated magnitude to this system as a whole, and thus demonstrate how "good" or "bad" existence is for a subject over this period.



Ch.7. "The mind" is defined as an entity which "processes information," leaving "mechanics" to encompass the remaining elements of reality. Ch.8. The "non-conscious mind" is defined to function essentially like a computer, with input, processing and output elements. Ch.9. The "conscious mind" is defined as something which requires sensation based motivation from which to function. The presented model of human consciousness contains input elements of *sensations, senses, and memory*, with a processing element of *thought* (which may also function with input and output characteristics), and an output element of *muscle operation*.

Ch.10. "Empathy," or the conforming sensations which may be experienced through perceptions of sensations in others, is theorized here as "the mechanism by which evolution developed conscious parenting." But since *human empathy* seems to concern far more than just our own children, apparently this dynamic did expand to cause general perceptions of sensations in others to incite conforming personal sensations in us. Furthermore apparently we do not simply have empathy for others, but we also desire perceptions that others have empathy for us.

Sensations associated with "theory of mind" seem to have such relevance as well, though they may conflict with the interests of others, or like empathy, they may conform. Here the non-conscious mind is theorized to produce punishing/rewarding sensations for the conscious mind to deal with, based upon personal understandings of how others perceive a subject, as well as how a subject perceives itself. Such positive and negative assessments may respectively be considered "healthy" and "unhealthy" – so for two examples, "disrespect" is experienced as a negative theory of mind sensation, while "pride" feels good.

Ch.11. Moving now to "the social entity," the personal model suggests that *social good* should be defined as "the aggregate value of sensations which two or more personal entities experience over a given period of time." This opportunity was taken to emphasize the need for subjects of reference to found all considerations of good/bad. I view widespread subject identification "error" to be a major reason that philosophers failed to achieve any generally accepted theory of good/bad so far, with examples presented from the ideas of Derek Parfit and Jeromy Bentham. Furthermore, the tremendous potential *repugnancy* of my own theory is explored here as well.

[Select to open "Chapter 12" blog page.](#)

[Select to Return to "Chapter 1: Introduction"](#)

[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)

## A Final Author's Note

I've built an ideology from which to theorize answers for all personal and social questions of relevance to a given subject, or that which is good/bad for it. The stated premise is that this question does not simply concern arbitrary/anecdotal philosophy, but rather an aspect of reality that "mental/behavioral" varieties of science will need to theorize in order to emerge from their "primitive states." Though various examples of my theory have been shown along the way, the focus of this discussion has simply been "to describe reality," with an emphasis on "conscious life," and particularly "the human." But what does this perspective practically imply? *How specifically can* an individual or society promote its sensation based interests, given its specific circumstances? Here I extend an invitation to all for intelligent discussion of both the potential consistencies and inconsistencies of these models against observation, as well as their practical personal and social implications. This work has now consumed me for over half my life, though I should indeed have some time left for general discussion.

Here I do expect "heated conversation with my own ilk." Throughout the universities of our world and beyond exist the descendants of an ancient society that seeks to build "philosophical understandings." But apparently we've also "failed" – today we have virtually no generally accepted theory regarding philosophical dynamics. Thus by advertising this deficiency I should also invoke the ire of those who are perhaps "proud" of our various perceived achievements.

Furthermore my work seems to also have implications to "science" — a great institution which has indeed developed a vast field of accepted theory. But I presume that it will not hastily consent to the expansion which I propose, and will also fight the notion that its "mental/behavioral" fields could be nearly as troubled as I've suggested. But if this community cannot practically demonstrate that personal relevance is "fundamentally arbitrary/anecdotal," "naturally unscientific," or otherwise "impossible for human comprehension," then the institution of science should indeed be required to take up the ancient philosophical question of "good" in order to also become "more whole" in this regard.

Moving now to the practical business of determining how specific individuals and societies may "lead their existence properly," yes I do also consider such questions from the perspective of my theory – though perhaps in an unusual way...

Observe standard political discourse. This commonly seems to be a process where we demonstrate the "horrible" implications of an opponent's ideas, as well as the "pleasing" implications of our own. The associated attack and defense here should be quite familiar to those of us that live in the democracies of our world, and perhaps beyond.

For my part, however, a somewhat different discussion is sought. I do not seek to demonstrate that the implications of my own ideas happen to be "pleasing," or that the implications of an opponent's are not. Thus my response to a standard attack must simply be to check whether or not the assumptions which have been made seem "valid," as well as if an accurate interpretation of my theory does seem to exist. If so, however, then regardless of how "distasteful" a given implication may seem, I simply must not object.

Though this approach might also be termed "political suicide," I do nevertheless remain confident. Regardless of how my "repugnant theory" may cause me to be

perceived, I do find hope in the following belief: Once our "mental/behavioral" sciences accept philosophical elements of reality as their own burden, the "greatest" revolution in human understandings, should indeed occur.

To now conclude this discussion, please consider the following argument for a coming "greatest" human revolution...

What has been the most prominent effect of science upon humanity so far? Observe that by teaching us about reality it has brought us both more and less "useful" types of understandings. Furthermore over the past few centuries we've used some of the more useful in order to develop various tools and such that provide us with astounding abilities. Thus it might be stated that the most prominent effect of science upon humanity so far, has been to provide us with "unprecedented power."

Apparently "power," however, can also be "dangerous." A person that gains tremendous new abilities should also gain the potential to make tremendous new mistakes – and apparently our societies display this vulnerability no less. So in retrospect the state of our world over the past few centuries of science fueled power, without a balancing science fueled theory from which to use our power properly, should not be surprising. I suspect that this dynamic is sufficient to explain every great "horror" associated with "the age of science." (Please choose your own examples of "personal and social horrors," to assess whether or not they each stem from an inability to understand how to lead our lives and structure our societies "properly," given our tremendous science provided modern abilities.)

It is from this perspective which I reason that the "greatest" achievement of science, will not gain this distinction by imparting still greater human abilities. Thus neither Newton nor Einstein (my own favorites), would merit such a distinction, nor would this be earned by developing a successful "[theory of everything](#)," nor a means from which to "live well without polluting," nor the ability to "colonize the galaxy," nor even the development of a method from which to "exist perpetually in perfect contentment." Rather than provide us with "still greater abilities," I suspect that the greatest achievement of science will rather "rebalance" its traditional gift. By further teaching us about reality, I believe that science will soon give us a theoretical understanding from which to use our power "properly." Once our "mental/behavioral" sciences accept philosophical elements of reality as their own burden, we should soon find that this "greatest understanding of them all," will be achieved. Here scientific theory of good/bad will rebalance our disproportionately great modern abilities.

**[Select to open "A Final Author's Note" blog page.](#)**

**[Select to return to "Selectable Table of Contents."](#)**

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\\_US](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US).